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Peer-to-peer (p2p) approaches are an increasingly eﬀective way to deploy services.
Popular examples include BitTorrent, Skype, and KaZaA. These approaches are
attractive because they can be highly fault-tolerant, scalable, adaptive, and less
expensive than a more centralized solution. Cooperation lies at the heart of these
strengths. Yet, in settings where working together is crucial, a natural question
is: “What if users stop cooperating?” After all, cooperative services are typically
deployed over multiple administrative domains, and thus vulnerable to Byzantine
failures and users who may act selﬁshly.
This dissertation explores how to construct p2p systems to tolerate Byzan-
tine participants while also incentivizing selﬁsh participants to contribute resources.
We describe how to balance obedience against choice in building a robust p2p live
viii
streaming system. Imposing obedience is desirable as it leaves little room for peers
to attack or cheat the system. However, providing choice is also attractive as it
allows us to engineer ﬂexible and eﬃcient solutions.
We ﬁrst focus on obedience by using Nash equilibria to drive the design
of BAR Gossip, the ﬁrst gossip protocol that is resilient to Byzantine and selﬁsh
nodes. BAR Gossip relies on veriﬁable pseudo-random partner selection to elimi-
nate non-determinism, which can be used to game the system, while maintaining
the robustness and rapid convergence of traditional gossip. A novel fair enough ex-
change primitive entices cooperation among selﬁsh peers on short timescales, thereby
avoiding the need for distributed reputation schemes. We next focus on tempering
obedience with choice by using approximate equilibria to guide the construction of
a novel p2p live streaming system. These equilibria allow us to design incentives to
limit selﬁsh behavior rigorously, yet provide suﬃcient ﬂexibility to build practical
systems. We show the advantages of using an -Nash equilibrium, instead of an
exact Nash, to design and implement FlightPath, our live streaming system that
uses bandwidth eﬃciently, absorbs ﬂash crowds, adapts to sudden peer departures,
handles churn, and tolerates malicious activity.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In 1999, the infamous ﬁle-sharing program Napster [55] demonstrated that peer-
to-peer (p2p) applications can be a very eﬀective and disruptive technology. Since
then, greater accessibility of broadband connections, decreasing storage costs, and
more powerful microprocessors have made p2p an increasingly popular way to deploy
services. P2P approaches are attractive because they can be highly fault-tolerant,
scalable, and adaptive. Moreover, a p2p design can be less expensive than a tradi-
tional client-server approach, thereby lowering the barriers to entry in markets such
as content distribution, telecommunications, and audio/video streaming. BitTor-
rent [18], KaZaA [36], Limewire [44], Skype [72], and LiveStation [48] are a small
sample of today’s well-known p2p applications.
Of course, diﬀerent p2p services can take vastly diﬀerent technological ap-
proaches in their applications. Yet, no matter how traditional or innovative we are,
all p2p systems rely on a shared principle: cooperation. Peers pool their resources
to achieve a common goal. Cooperation gives p2p systems their vaunted strengths.
But those advantages are only as solid as the foundation on which they rest, leading
to a simple question: What if peers stop cooperating?
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1.1 Motivation
An application may never see the typical p2p beneﬁts—such as scalability and
adaptability—if it does not tolerate Byzantine users who may disrupt the service or
selﬁsh ones who may try to use it without contributing their fair share. Designing
a practical p2p system that deals with both Byzantine and selﬁsh users is challeng-
ing. First, the system needs to work well in a range of settings. For example, in
a ﬁle-sharing application, users should typically see high download speeds despite
the inherent unpredictability of the Internet. Second, the system should continue to
work well despite the presence of Byzantine users. Byzantine behavior is inevitable
in large-scale systems: computers crash, programs contain bugs, people misconﬁg-
ure their systems, and some users will attack the system. Third, the system should
ensure that selﬁsh participants actually cooperate. Selﬁsh peers are an unfortunate
reality of p2p systems. Adar and Huberman estimate that nearly 70% of Gnutella
users share no ﬁles [1]. When widespread, such behavior can severely hurt any
service whose foundation relies on cooperation.
Several deployed applications [18, 36] and research prototypes [19, 31, 33, 57,
64, 63, 70] have recognized the need to curb selﬁsh actions. Despite these systems’
built-in incentives and punishments, selﬁsh participants still frequently ﬁnd ways
to cheat. For example, consider the KaZaA network [36] in which it is estimated
that nearly half the peers use KaZaA Lite [37], which falsiﬁes users’ contributions.
The popular application BitTorrent uses a tit-for-tat based mechanism to encourage
cooperation. However, Schneidman et al. [68] identify several ways a client could
cheat, weaknesses that have since been exploited in recent BitTorrent clients [49,
64, 70].
Levin et al. [41] bring to light BitTorrent’s ad hoc design by debunking
the popular belief that BitTorrent uses a tit-for-tat mechanism. They show that
BitTorrent actually uses an auction-based scheme, a design decision that explains
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BitTyrant’s [64] success in uploading only enough to trigger reciprocation. These
vulnerabilities and misunderstandings in BitTorrent illustrate a broader point in
system design: almost no p2p system rigorously shows that its built-in incentives
and punishments are enough to induce cooperation.
We therefore take a formal approach to building a system to tolerate both
Byzantine and selﬁsh participants. We base our approach on the BAR model [3] in
which Aiyer et al. combine game theory with traditional Byzantine fault-tolerance
in building a cooperative backup system. This dissertation begins by leveraging
techniques pioneered in the original BAR work and applying them in a new setting:
p2p live streaming.
1.2 Contributions
This dissertation focuses on constructing p2p live streaming systems that are sup-
ported by a rigorous theoretical foundation. Live streaming is an increasingly useful
application at several scales of deployment. For example, the ﬁrst 2008 presidential
debate was watched by over 1 million people online. At smaller scales, such as aca-
demic conferences or local concerts, there may be interest in providing a live stream,
but little existing infrastructure to support it.
At all these scales, a p2p streaming solution is an intriguing alternative to
traditional methods. For example, such a solution could absorb the impact of an
unexpected ﬂash crowd. Furthermore, large-scale content providers may adopt p2p-
based solutions to shift costs (like bandwidth) to clients, and small-scale providers
might ﬁnd it simpler to use a self-organizing network instead of provisioning and
maintaining a large dedicated server.
We have built two systems, BAR Gossip and FlightPath, that tolerate Byzan-
tine and selﬁsh peers. We base both systems on gossip protocols [10, 21]. As with all
gossip protocols, peers in our protocols periodically exchange recently received data
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with random neighbors. Birman et al. [10] show how such a simple communication
pattern yields a robust and highly reliable multicast. For this reason, some have
used gossip-based mechanisms as part of their streaming systems [32, 33, 60, 63].
Yet, to our knowledge, no one has considered how robust these mechanisms actually
are with Byzantine and selﬁsh peers. The key challenge we face in building a p2p
live streaming system is in how to induce cooperation in a practical system.
BAR Gossip: A Purist Approach BAR Gossip consists of two novel gossip
protocols, Balanced Exchange and Optimistic Push. We construct Balanced Ex-
change to be a Nash equilibrium [56]—a condition in which no selﬁsh peer has an
incentive to act alone in trying to cheat the system. In designing Balanced Exchange,
we immediately face two practical hurdles. First, gossip’s robustness stems from its
randomness, a trait that makes it diﬃcult to enforce obedience since peers can mask
suspicious behavior as the product of improbable though not impossible events. We
overcome the randomness problem by creating a veriﬁable pseudo-random algo-
rithm. Second, the fair exchange of data between two peers is provably impossible
to achieve without a trusted arbiter [25], which can be a bottleneck at large scales.
We sidestep the impossibility result by designing an exchange primitive that is fair
enough, guaranteeing that selﬁsh peers do not attempt to cheat others in trades.
Our desire to ensure that cheating is not beneﬁcial results in a theoretically
appealing Balanced Exchange protocol that performs poorly. To ﬁx this performance
issue, we introduce the second half of BAR Gossip, Optimistic Push. This protocol
is similar to Balanced Exchange, except that it allows peers to trade data with the
hope, rather than the certainty, that they will receive the same number of useful data
packets in return. Together with Balanced Exchange, the Optimistic Push protocol
achieves good performance but has a theoretical drawback: We cannot prove that the
Optimistic Push protocol is a Nash equilibrium, although our experiments suggest
it is not easy to cheat the protocol.
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FlightPath: A Practical and Rigorous Approach BAR Gossip’s resilience
to Byzantine and selﬁsh peers is a good start towards designing p2p live streaming
systems under the BAR model. However, our experience suggests that strict equilib-
ria (e.g., Nash equilibria) may not provide the ﬂexibility necessary to achieve great
performance in p2p systems (whether for live streaming or not). We therefore turn
to approximate equilibria, and in particular, -Nash equilibria [15] in which selﬁsh
peers expect to gain at most a factor of  from unilateral deviations. We use these
equilibria to trade resilience to cheating for practical concerns like performance and
low overhead.
FlightPath—our streaming system based on -Nash equilibria—signiﬁcantly
improves stream quality over Balanced Exchange and Optimistic Push. The strength
of these equilibria is that they allow us to balance enforcing obedience against pro-
viding enough ﬂexibility to adapt to challenging situations. An example of this
balancing act is in how we craft FlightPath’s partner selection algorithm to both
limit the number of partners that Byzantine peers can simultaneously contact while
oﬀering enough choices for other peers to select good trading partners. In addition
to these practical beneﬁts, -Nash equilibria also have theoretical ones. We can
prove that FlightPath is an -Nash equilibrium without relying on experiments that
only suggest this condition as we did when assessing whether Optimistic Push is a
strict Nash equilibrium.
1.3 Roadmap
This dissertation consists of seven chapters. In the ﬁrst, we provide motivation and
an overview of the entire document.
Chapter 2 summarizes related work. Most readers may skip this chapter to more
quickly reach the technical contributions of this dissertation. This chapter explains
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where this work ﬁts in the existing body of research on content distribution, gossip
protocols, game theory and mechanism design, and p2p streaming systems.
Chapter 3 provides background on relevant game-theoretic concepts used in this
dissertation. We use the framework already established by game theory to reason
about how a selﬁsh user would behave. This chapter also explains our assumptions
regarding communication channels and node failures. In short, it deﬁnes our system
model.
Chapter 4 describes the ﬁrst half of BAR Gossip, Balanced Exchange, detailing
the veriﬁable pseudorandom partner algorithm and the fair enough exchange mech-
anism. In addition, we prove in this chapter that the Balanced Exchange protocol
is a Nash equilibrium.
Chapter 5 addresses some of the practical concerns inherent to Balanced Ex-
change. We introduce BAR Gossip’s second half, Optimistic Push, and discuss its
similarities and diﬀerences with Balanced Exchange. This chapter also compares
BAR Gossip to a traditional gossip algorithm, assesses the robustness of Optimistic
Push to cheating strategies, and evaluates BAR Gossip under attack.
Chapter 6 proposes approximate equilibria as a new way to design p2p services.
We design and implement FlightPath, a novel p2p live streaming system based on
-Nash equilibria. This chapter describes the basic design of FlightPath and the
heuristics we use to improve overall performance. Additionally, we also discuss
implementation details of the FlightPath prototype and an evaluation of FlightPath
in several settings.
Chapter 7 highlights open questions related to designing robust p2p services and
concludes this document.
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Chapter 2
Related Work
This dissertation builds on a broad set of contributions in gossip protocols, bulk ﬁle
transfer, and p2p streaming protocols. In the rest of this section, we summarize
the works that have inﬂuenced BAR Gossip and FlightPath the most, drawing
comparisons when appropriate.
2.1 Gossip Protocols
In BAR Gossip and FlightPath, we incorporate many techniques from several works
in the gossip literature. In their seminal work, Demers et al. [21] show how to apply
concepts from epidemiology to maintain consistency across replicated databases. De-
mers et al. resolved the scalability and performance problems of maintaining consis-
tency across Xerox’s Clearinghouse servers [58] by using epidemic algorithms to pro-
vide a weak form of consistency. In time, epidemic protocols also came to be known
as gossip protocols. Years later, Petersen et al. [62] extend epidemic techniques from
databases to ﬁlesystems. The resulting weakly consistent system, Bayou, was impor-
tant in its conceptually simple approach—pair-wise update propagation—leading to
a ﬁlesystem that could support a diverge range of networking environments.
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Birman et al. [10] propose Bimodal Multicast, going beyond using gossip
techniques for just maintaining replica consistency. They design a highly reliable
multicast protocol that works in two phases. The ﬁrst phase uses a light-weight
best-eﬀort multicast, such as IP Multicast, to carry out the initial spread of data
in the system. The second phase leverages gossip as a repair mechanism, informing
those nodes still ignorant of the latest updates. Bimodal Multicast ensures that
nodes receive updates with high probability, establishing a middle ground between
100% reliable multicast protocols and best-eﬀort approaches—the former scaling
poorly and the latter providing disappointing guarantees.
In Astrolabe [74], van Renesse et al. show how to use gossip in yet an-
other area: distributed monitoring and management. Astrolabe uses gossip-based
techniques in a broader infrastructure for information management. Gossip pro-
vides a scalable way for nodes to exchange state with another, enabling a number
of Astrolabe’s applications: publish-subscribe, resource location, attribute aggre-
gation, and large-scale state monitoring. Moreover, gossip provides a mechanism
by which Astrolabe can manage membership information, incorporating new nodes
when appropriate and removing very old entries that probably correspond to failed
computers.
Eugster et al. [23] improve gossip’s scalability in their work on light-weight
probabilistic broadcast protocols (lpbcast). They propose a better message buﬀering
algorithm that prioritizes gossiping more rare updates over those that are more well-
known. In addition, Eugster et al. show that nodes do not have to maintain full
membership lists to retain the robustness of gossip. A node can maintain a partial
view that is selected uniformly at random from the full list. Their algorithm to
maintain partial views appears to provide views that are close to random. Ganesh et
al. [24] extend this partial view technique in Scamp, where they develop an algorithm
to grow and shrink view sizes in a decentralized manner relative to system size.
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Although techniques to maintain partial membership views strive to retain
the robustness properties inherent to true randomness, both lpbcast and Scamp
have not been thoroughly analyzed to determine whether gossip’s robustness has
indeed been kept. In Cyclon [77], Voulgaris et al. propose a way for nodes to shuﬄe
their partial views so that the resulting communication graph imposed by those
views possesses many desirable properties of random graphs, namely low diameter,
low clustering, highly symmetric node degrees, and remarkable resilience to failures.
Araneola [52], by Melamed et al., also improve upon overlay construction. Their
approach allows nodes to dynamically build and maintain k-regular graphs in which
every node has either degree k or k + 1. By controlling the randomness in graph
construction, Araneola is able to improve load, reliability, and latency compared to
standard gossip-based multicast approaches.
Johansen et al. [35] depart from traditional gossip-based membership man-
agement by aiming for a protocol that tolerates Byzantine participants while main-
taining full membership lists. They argue that memory overheads are not the prob-
lem. Rather, overheads stemming from join and leave events can cause a high
amount of network traﬃc. Johansen et al. demonstrate that FlightPath can main-
tain full membership lists and tolerate Byzantine members, while incurring modest
network overheads. To our knowledge, Brahms [11], by Bortnikov et al., is the latest
in the series of gossip-based membership protocols. This system is unique in its abil-
ity to tolerate Byzantine members while maintaining small view sizes. Key to their
approach is a technique that enables nodes to independently and uniformly sample
from the space of existing members. This achievement is a fundamental advance as
previous techniques could only provide small views that empirically appeared to be
random, whereas Brahms does so in theory as well.
Although gossip is appealing because of its simplicity and increased robust-
ness, those beneﬁts come with a cost. At large-scales, its uniformly random nature
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can generate a large number of packets that congest common links. A few have
proposed techniques to lift gossip’s ignorance of the underlying topology. In their
Leaf Box Hierarchy, Gupta et al. [30] organize peers into leaf boxes, which reside at
the leaves of a tree. A member gossips with a neighbor with decreasing probability
the farther away a member is in the tree. Provided that the mapping from members
to leaf boxes reﬂects the proximity of nodes in the network, this gossiping algorithm
reduces stress on common links that connect clusters of peers. Note that Gupta et
al. leave a good mapping unspeciﬁed. In Directional Gossip [45], Lin and Marzullo
adopt a diﬀerent approach, advocating the use of two gossip protocols to cope with
wide area network settings. They propose using a standard gossip algorithm within
LANs and a separate algorithm across LANs. Nodes in diﬀerent LANs gossip with
one another with probability decreasing the better connected those two nodes are to
one another, where connectivity is measured according to the size of the minimum
link-disjoint set between those two nodes. The intuition behind this approach is
that nodes which are not well-connected should seize the opportunity to gossip with
one another.
To our knowledge, only two gossip protocols have taken advantage of network
coding: Slingshot [7] and Ricochet [6] 1. Both systems use receiver-based network
coding as a repair mechanism in case an initial unreliable multicast fails to reach
every node. Receiver-based network coding allows rapid recovery from message
losses in time critical environments. Their authors intend Ricochet and Slingshot to
be used in data centers where message loss occurs at the nodes and the networking
infrastructure is assumed to be nearly infallible.
1As “Balakrishnan et al.” could refer to either Slingshot or Ricochet, we refer to each system
by name instead of by the authors.
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2.2 File-sharing and Incentives
Perhaps the most well-known ﬁle-sharing program today is BitTorrent [18]. Its
incentive structure, wide-availability, and numerous implementations have made
it one of the most eﬀective ways to transfer large ﬁles for both lawful and less
lawful purposes. Those incentives suggest a robustness not seen in previous ﬁle-
sharing applications such as Limewire [44] or Napster [55]. In this section, we
summarize recent works that exploit weak points in BitTorrent’s design, weaknesses
that illustrate the dangers of informal incentive-based approaches. We begin with a
summary of BitTorrent’s incentive structure.
A BitTorrent client has incentive to upload to other clients as such action
may trigger others to respond in kind. By default, a client chokes its uploads to all
other clients. Periodically, a client chooses 4 clients to be unchoked. The 3 clients
who have uploaded the most to a client comprise 3 out of those 4 unchoke slots.
A client chooses the last slot at random. A BitTorrent client divides its upload
bandwidth equally across the 4 partners that it has unchoked.
Shneidman et al. [68] identify several ways to game the BitTorrent protocol.
Using a technique they name manual backtracing, Shneidman et al. propose four
modiﬁcations to a BitTorrent client that can decrease download time or let a user
free-ride oﬀ others.
1. The BitTorrent protocol is susceptible to a Sybil attack [22]; a client wishing
to free-ride can create multiple identities to increase the chances of being
optimistically unchoked.
2. There is little incentive for a peer to use more upload bandwidth than is nec-
essary to be one of the top 3 uploaders for a neighbor. That extra bandwidth
can be conserved or diverted to be a top 3 uploader for a diﬀerent neighbor.
3. Once an optimistically unchoked client is again choked, that client has an
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incentive to disconnect from its partner and reconnect. This exploit is an
artifact of the original BitTorrent implementation.
4. A client can be credited with uploading data even if the data it uploads is
garbage.
Although Shneidman et al. identify these weaknesses, they ignore the degree
to which each can be exploited. Some may be theoretically possible but of little
consequence practically. Uploading garbage data is clearly a practical weakness and
is addressed in later BitTorrent clients such as Azureus [5]. Recent works have shown
the remaining three are also weaknesses that can be gamed in practice [41, 49, 70].
In BitThief [49], Locher et al. instrument a client to reconnect to the tracker
several times to obtain a large list of possible partners. A BitThief client then
contacts all of these partners and is therefore known by many more peers than
normal. Although not a Sybil attack, the underlying motivation is the same—
increase the probability of being optimistically unchoked. Almost concurrently,
Sirivianos et al. [70] develop an identical attack and term it the large-view exploit.
Sirivianos et al. also include the third technique by Shneidman et al. to take
advantage of the BitTorrent speciﬁcation. Both works demonstrate free-riding is
quite feasible in real BitTorrent swarms.
In BitTyrant [64], Piatek et al. explore how a strategic client can alter how it
portions out upload bandwidth to increase aggregate download rates. A BitTyrant
client estimates how much bandwidth is needed to be considered a top 3 uploader
with respect to its neighbors. Any extra upload bandwidth is used to attract other
neighbors. BitTyrant’s heuristics show that a clever client can signiﬁcantly improve
its performance by being more strategic in who it uploads to and how much it
uploads.
Levin et al. [41] dispel a common belief that BitTorrent’s incentives stem
from a tit-for-tat strategy. Although this observation is not new [68, 70], Levin et
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al. show that BitTorrent’s structure is essentially an auction that awards the top 3
bidders. They improve on BitTorrent’s incentive structure by redesigning auctions
such that the rewards are proportional to the amount of upload bandwidth each
client bids. Framing BitTorrent’s incentive structure cleanly captures the success of
Piatek et al. with BitTyrant. Moreover, Levin et al. reveal a ﬁfth way to game the
protocol. A clever client can selectively lie about not having a ﬁle block to prolong
beneﬁcial relationships.
BitTorrent illustrates the power of using a p2p approach to deploy services.
However, its weaknesses, as highlighted by several researchers, point to the dangers
of an informal approach in dealing with selﬁsh behavior. These shortcoming have
triggered a series of proposals for more robust incentives in ﬁle-sharing systems [42,
54, 71, 75]. We elide a thorough discussion of incentives in ﬁle-sharing systems,
focusing instead on incentives in streaming applications.
2.3 Streaming and Incentives
BAR Gossip and FlightPath are the latest in a series of p2p streaming proposals
that include incentives to encourage cooperation. Our work diﬀers from previous
approaches in two important ways. First, we require our systems to tolerate Byzan-
tine behavior. Second, we focus on showing formally that our incentives are enough
to induce obedience. Existing p2p live streaming systems either crumble with the
existence of even one malicious peer or fail to justify that the incentives provided are
indeed enough. In this section, we begin with a brief summary of some streaming
systems that do not incorporate incentives. Afterwards, we discuss systems that
provide incentives.
Because IP multicast has failed in gaining widespread adoption across In-
ternet service providers, many have designed application-level multicast protocols
using overlay networks. Overcast [34] is one of the ﬁrst systems to explore using
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overlay networks to disseminate data. In Overcast, Jannotti et al. design heuristics
to build trees optimized for high-bandwidth data dissemination.
SplitStream [13] builds a forest of trees to disseminate data. In this system,
Castro et al. leverage the mechanisms in Pastry [66] and Scribe [12] to construct
trees that spread the work of forwarding data evenly across participating nodes.
Their techniques ensure that no node serves as an internal node in more than one
tree. Ngan et al. [57] take advantage of the SplitStream design and propose a
punishment scheme to discourage free-riding behavior. Their approach penalizes
internal nodes who decide to not forward data by periodically restructuring the
tree, allowing the descendants a selﬁsh user may have hurt to respond in kind. This
scheme quickly loses its appeal when we consider that a malicious peer can trigger
frequent restructurings.
Instead of focusing on punishments, some works incentivize cooperation by
oﬀering peers who contribute increased resilience to benign failures. Habib and
Chuang [31] employ a scoring system that tracks a peer’s contributions. A peer
with a high score has more options in choosing where to obtain data, and therefore,
more resilience in case some peers crash or are unreachable. In Climber [61], Park
et al. initially organize peers into a tree and then insert redundant links to a form
a mesh where peers who contribute more are rewarded with more redundant links.
PULSE [63] rewards users who contribute by placing them closer to the source
with respect to how data is distributed. The assumption is that a user beneﬁts
from less delay between when a live event occurs and when it appears on a user’s
screen. Liu et al. [47] adopt a BitTorrent-like strategy, specifying that each peer
should upload to those partners who have contributed the most. This scheme also
incorporates an optimistic unchoke technique, making their system vulnerable to the
free-riding strategies that plague BitTorrent. In short, although many of the above
works propose incentives to encourage cooperation, these approaches provide no
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justiﬁcation that the inherent rewards are compelling enough to induce cooperation.
Chu et al. [17] sidestep the worry that users may cheat by simply positing that
users are incapable of modifying the software. They assume that a peer’s behaviors
are limited to changing how much to contribute, ignoring more sophisticated and
subtle strategies that may indeed be better. Chu et al. focus on designing a linear
taxation model that requires those with more available bandwidth to contribute
more than those with less available bandwidth. Their work focuses on what the
taxes should be for diﬀerent upload capabilities, not how to enforce the collecting
of such taxes.
Equicast [38], by Keidar et al., is the ﬁrst work to formally deal with selﬁsh
users in a p2p streaming setting. They structure the system such that it is in a
peer’s best interest to follow the protocol, assuming that the peer can only change
how many connections to maintain and how many packets to send on each connec-
tion. Although theoretically valuable, Equicast relies on a number of impractical
assumptions, such as a peer being hurt inﬁnitely much if it misses even one block of
the stream. Further, Equicast is a purely theoretical work, without simulations or
a prototype to assess practicality. Lin et al. [46] similarly take a formal approach,
providing a game-theoretic framework in which one could analyze a p2p live stream-
ing application. However, they leave open how to actually design a system to be a
Nash equilibrium.
To our knowledge, SecureStream [32] is the only other work designed to
tolerate malicious behavior in a p2p live streaming setting. Leveraging an intrusion-
tolerant membership protocol, Fireﬂies [35], SecureStream is resilient to denial of
service attacks, forgery, and several other attacks. Haridasan et al. [33] later extend
the SecureStream system by augmenting it with an infrastructure to audit peers’
contributions. Although eﬀective in simulation, the resulting protocol lacks a formal
analysis bounding the gains from attempting to cheat.
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While there have been several works that use incentives in ﬁle-sharing and stream-
ing settings, few approaches also deal with Byzantine behavior. The work in this
dissertation draws from the contributions made by Aiyer et al. [3] in proposing the
BAR model to cope with Byzantine behaviors and selﬁsh actions. Aiyer et al. iden-
tify that existing models are ill-equipped to deal with both kinds of deviations. In
the traditional Byzantine failure model, any deviation is considered a fault, mean-
ing that system designers may have to consider situations in which nearly every
participant is Byzantine—a characterization that perhaps overstates the problem.
Traditional economics models are well-armed against selﬁsh participants, but pro-
vide little relief against participants who may break incentive structures by acting
irrationally. Aiyer et al. use the BAR model to design a cooperative backup system
based on a replicated state machine architecture that enforces obedience while tol-
erating a bounded number of Byzantine failures. BAR Gossip and FlightPath adopt
a very diﬀerent approach by leveraging gossip’s scalability to disseminate data.
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Chapter 3
Background & Model
In this chapter, we provide background on relevant concepts from game theory and
their analogues in distributed system design. Afterwards, we describe the setting in
which we plan to stream data.
3.1 Game Theory Background
We can frame many interactions, both in real life and the online world, as games
in which players participate to receive payoﬀs. In these interactions, game theory
provides a framework to reason about strategic behavior and lets us predict the
outcomes when players seek to increase their payoﬀs perhaps at the expense of other
players. As even a basic game theory primer could consume an entire dissertation,
we include only those topics relevant to understanding our contributions. Where
appropriate, we relate game theoretic deﬁnitions to their analogues in distributed
systems.
A game consists of a set of players N , a set of strategies Si for each player i,
and a set of utility functions {u1, . . . , un}, where n = |N |. Each player participates
in the game by taking individual actions. A player’s strategy determines which
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actions a player takes in diﬀerent situations. Since players typically interact with
one another, it is useful to refer to a strategy proﬁle s = (s1, . . . , sn), identifying
which strategy each player pursues. Given a proﬁle (s1, . . . , sn) and a player i, we
measure i′s payoﬀ or its utility using ui(s1, . . . , sn). Greater utilities correspond to
more eﬀective strategies. We occasionally use the notation (s−i, s∗i ) to refer to the
proﬁle in which player i is pursuing a strategy s∗i diﬀerent from its strategy in the
proﬁle s.
We consider games in which the participants are strategic or rational and
seek to increase their own utility. Several contributions in game theory focus on
predicting what rational players will do when presented with a game. If every
player is rational and believes all other players to be rational, what strategy will
each player adopt? Often, the reasoning can be confusing with loops such as “If I
play strategy A, then her best response is strategy B in which case I would play C.
However, she knows that I would play C if she played B, so she would play D to
counter my C. Since I know that she would play D to counter my C, then my best
response to D is to play strategy E, and so on.” A desirable property is when such
reasoning results in a stable strategy proﬁle, or an equilibrium.
Equilibria are important in game theory and the closely related subﬁeld,
mechanism design. Whereas game theory focuses on predicting a game’s outcome,
mechanism design strives to design games to achieve a particular outcome. We
declare success when we can design mechanisms so that the outcome we want is the
same as the outcome that game theory predicts. However, aligning our desires with
game theory’s predictions is usually diﬃcult. We may assign strategies to players
to achieve an outcome. Yet, a rational player may attempt to increase its own
utility by switching to a diﬀerent strategy. In this case, we say a player disobeys
its assigned strategy or defects. Our goal is to design a strategy proﬁle that would
achieve our desired outcome while also being an equilibrium, providing no incentive
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for any player to defect.
Distributed system design shares many concepts with game theory and mech-
anism design. Nodes assume the role of players and are assigned the strategy of
obeying the protocol. Therefore, a protocol speciﬁcation implicitly deﬁnes a strat-
egy proﬁle. When a node deviates from the protocol, that action is analogous to a
player defecting. We consider a protocol to be an equilibrium if the protocol deﬁnes
a strategy proﬁle that is an equilibrium. Such protocols are important in p2p sys-
tems because they deﬁne stable situations in which rational participants obey the
protocol.
In this dissertation, we design p2p protocols to achieve a very speciﬁc out-
come: reliably streaming live data. We craft mechanisms so that it is in every
peer’s interest to obey the protocol and use game theory to justify that claim. In
Chapters 4 and 5, we design protocols to be a particular kind of equilibria, Nash
equilibria [56] (deﬁned in Chapter 4). In Chapter 6, we create a protocol that is an
-Nash equilibria [15] (deﬁned in Chapter 6).
3.2 System Model
We consider the problem of streaming a live event over the Internet to a set of
clients (or peers). A tracker maintains the set of peers that subscribe to the live
event. A source divides time into rounds that are r len seconds long. In each round,
the source generates stream packets that expire after deadline rounds. The source
multicasts each packet to a small fraction seed frac of random clients.
Clients work together to disseminate those packets throughout the system.
When a stream packet expires, all peers that possess that packet deliver it to their
media application. If a peer delivers fewer updates than it should in a round, we
consider that round jittered and our goal is to minimize such rounds. We deﬁne the
jitter of a live stream to be the ratio of rounds jittered to the total number of rounds.
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Similarly, we deﬁne the reliability as the ratio of packets delivered on time to the
total number of packets. This reliability metric is analogous to SecureStream’s [32]
continuity index.
We assume that the source and tracker run as speciﬁed and do not fail, al-
though we could relax this assumption using standard techniques for fault-tolerance [67,
14]. Peers, however, may deviate from the speciﬁcation.
We use the BAR model [3] to classify peer behaviors as Byzantine, altruistic,
or rational. The premise of the BAR model is that when nodes can beneﬁt by
deviating, it may be untenable to bound the number of deviations to a small fraction.
Thus, we desire to create systems that continue to function even if all participants
are rational and willing to deviate for gain.
While many nodes behave rationally, some may be Byzantine and behave ar-
bitrarily because of a bug, misconﬁguration, or ill-will. We assume that the fraction
of nodes that are Byzantine is bound by Fbyz < 1. We also assume that rational
peers expect negative utility from communicating with peers known to be Byzantine.
Altruistic peers obey the given protocol.
Non-Byzantine peers maintain clocks synchronized with the tracker. Nodes
communicate over synchronous yet unreliable channels. We assume that each peer
has exactly one public key bound to a permanent id. In practice, we can discharge
this assumption by using a certiﬁcate authority or by implementing recent proposals
to defend against Sybil attacks [78].
We assume that cryptographic primitives—such as digital signatures, sym-
metric encryption, and one-way hashes—cannot be subverted. Our algorithms also
require that private keys generate unique signatures [9]. We denote a message m
signed by peer i as 〈m〉i. Non-Byzantine nodes ignore messages that cannot be
properly authenticated.
Finally, we hold peers accountable for the messages they send. We deﬁne a
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proof of misbehavior (PoM) as a signed message that proves a peer has deviated from
the protocol. A PoM against a peer is suﬃcient evidence for the source and tracker
to evict a peer from the system, never letting that peer join a streaming session with
that tracker or source in the future. We assume that eviction is a suﬃcient penalty
to deter any rational peer from sending a message that the receiver could present
as a PoM.
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Chapter 4
Balanced Exchange:
A Purist Approach
In this chapter, we present Balanced Exchange, the ﬁrst gossip protocol designed for
a setting in which some peers may be Byzantine while the remaining can be rational.
Despite this adversarial environment, Balanced Exchange provides a mechanism to
disseminate information that ensures steady throughput.
The deﬁning characteristic of gossip protocols is that each peer exchanges
data, or gossips, with randomly selected peers. It is precisely this randomness that
gives gossip protocols their enviable robustness, a trait that we want to maintain
in Balanced Exchange. However, from the perspective of designing protocols in a
Byzantine and rational setting, randomness can be a headache: in fact, any source
of non-determinism is hard to deal with because it gives opportunities for rational
users to hide deviations in the guise of legitimate non-deterministic behavior.
In Balanced Exchange, we overcome this diﬃculty by using veriﬁable ran-
domness [53]. In particular, we leverage the properties of pseudo-random number
generators and unique signature schemes to build a veriﬁable pseudo-random al-
gorithm. Although our algorithm does not provide the theoretical properties of
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veriﬁable random functions as seen in the number theory literature, it performs
well in practice. Furthermore, to our knowledge, there exists no implementation of
those more sophisticated schemes, while our algorithm is easily implemented given
existing cryptographic libraries. Our veriﬁable pseudo-random algorithm eliminates
the main source of non-determinism in traditional gossip—randomness in partner
selection—yet maintains the unpredictability and rapid convergence of traditional
gossip. In combination with a simple fair enough exchange primitive, our part-
ner selection algorithm is eﬀective in encouraging peers to trade updates with one
another.
In the remainder of this chapter, we describe the design of Balanced Exchange
and prove that it is a Nash equilibrium. At the end of this chapter, we include
simulation results indicating that, despite its theoretical appeal, Balanced Exchange
falls short of our practical goals. In the next chapter, we introduce Optimistic Push
to address these shortcomings.
4.1 Assumptions
We model a live event as an inﬁnite game. Rational peers are interested in acquring
stream updates that will ultimatley be delivered to their media applications. We
assume that a rational peer’s beneﬁt increases proportionally to the number of
unique stream updates it acquires. A rational peer’s cost increases according to
how much upload and download bandwidth that peer uses. Each unit of upload and
download bandwidth consumed costs a peer cu and cd, respectively.
Because we only consider live events that have no end times, we can ignore
end game strategies that rational peers may employ. Such strategies seek to cheat
at the end of a game because doing so is less risky than cheating at the beginning
or middle.
Additionally, rational peers never risk eviction; they never send a proof of
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misbehavior (PoM), which could result in their own eviction from the system. In
our model, an evicted rational peer is actually a contradiction. Recall that it is
rational to act in ways to increase utility (calculated as beneﬁts minus costs). Yet,
an evicted peer stops receiving stream updates, and in the limit receives 0 beneﬁt.
We curb rational deviations in our cooperative system, by designing Balanced
Exchange to be an ex ante Nash equilibrium [56].
Deﬁnition 1 A protocol is an ex ante Nash equilibrium if it deﬁnes a strategy
proﬁle such that each rational player expects no gain from unilaterally deviating.
More formally, a strategy proﬁle s = (s0, . . . , sn) is an ex ante Nash equilibrium if for
every player i there exists no strategy s∗i such that i expects utility ui(s−i, s∗i ) > ui(s)
from following s∗i .
In the rest of this dissertation, we elide ‘ex ante’ for brevity. In the frame-
work of Nash equilibria, we assume that rational peers only consider strategies that
maximize the number of useful updates received in each exchange independent of
concurrent or future exchanges. This greedy strategy is reasonable in a streaming
setting where there is a limited amount of time to obtain useful updates. However,
it is possible that more sophisticated strategies optimizing over multiple exchanges
can achieve greater utility. We also assume that it is always in a rational peer’s
interest to participate in exchanges provided it is missing at least one update.
4.2 Design
The Balanced Exchange protocol describes a method for a source to send a stream
of data to a set of clients. Streaming a live event requires Balanced Exchange to
ensure that clients who obey the protocol deliver only authentic stream packets and
that such clients receive nearly all stream packets in a timely manner. Although
we can provide the ﬁrst property in all situations, the second property is elusive,
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and will require the addition of the Optimistic Push protocol described in the next
chapter.
Before the start of a live event, each peer generates a session key pair con-
sisting of a public and private key. Peers sign up for the event by divulging both
keys to the tracker. The tracker then veriﬁes the keys, closes the sign up service,
and posts a list that contains each peer’s identity, address, and public key. Peers
sign protocol messages using their private keys to provide authentication, integrity,
and non-repudiation of message contents.
During a live event, the source divides the stream into discrete ﬁxed-size
stream updates. In each round, the source multicasts each of ups per round updates
to a fraction seed frac of random clients. The source signs each of these updates
so that clients can verify the stream data’s authenticity.
Since each peer is unlikely to receive every update directly from the source,
peers rely on Balanced Exchange to garner the remaining. The Balanced Exchange
protocol allows clients to trade equal numbers of updates with one another. That is,
if client S has ten updates to oﬀer client R and R has only ﬁve to oﬀer in return, then
S and R trade ﬁve updates in each direction. We construct each balanced exchange
so that it is a Nash equilibrium, thereby motivating rational clients to conduct the
trade faithfully. For reference, Figure 4.1 illustrates a balanced exchange between
two peers.
4.2.1 Overview
Balanced Exchange provides a mechanism for peers to exchange updates without
worrying that rational peers will cheat their trading partners. In a balanced ex-
change, each party determines the largest number of new updates it can trade on a
one-for-one basis. While a client initiates an exchange with another client, it also
responds to Balanced Exchange requests. An exchange consists of four phases.
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Balanced Exchange Protocol
Sender (S) Receiver (R)
seed = <round, BAL>S
check: seed is valid
PRNG(seed) maps to R
k = min( | HS-HR |, | HR-HS | )
check: upd_list matches check: upd_list' matches
check: {u1, ...., uk}KSR
 check: {u'1, ...., u'k}KRS
 
buff = buff U  {u1, ...., uk}  
KSR = #(          , seed)K
priv
S KRS = #(           , seed)K
priv
R<BRIEFCASE, S, R, seed, upd_list, {u1, ...., uk}KSR,
#M
R
>
S
<BRIEFCASE, R, S, seed, upd_list', {u'1, ...., u'k}KRS,
#M
S
>
R
<KEY_REQUEST, S, R, seed>
S
<KEY_REQUEST, R, S, seed>
R
<KEY_RESPONSE, S, R, seed, KSR 
>
S
<KEY_RESPONSE, R, S, seed, KRS>R
buff = buff U  {u'1, ...., u'k}  
TCP
UDP
<DIVULGE, S, R, seed, HS, #MR>S
<BAL_RESPONSE, R, S, seed, #(HR), #MS>R
<BAL_REQUEST, S, R, seed, #(HS), evict>S
Figure 4.1: Balanced Exchange Protocol for client S contacting client R.
Partner Selection: A peer selects another peer with whom to trade using a veri-
ﬁable pseudo-random algorithm.
History Exchange: The two parties learn about the unexpired updates the other
party holds and determines the largest number k of updates that can be ex-
changed equally.
Update Exchange Each party deterministically generates an encryption key based
upon its private key and a per-exchange seed value. Each party then encrypts
its k most recent exchangeable updates and copies the encrypted updates into
a briefcase that is sent to the other party.
Key Exchange The parties swap keys and decrypt the contents of received brief-
cases. If a peer does not receive a decryption key in a timely manner, that
peer sends a key request to its partner. After decrypting updates, peers update
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their histories to reﬂect the new updates they have just received.
A peer ends an exchange early in the history exchange phase if that peer
realizes the exchange will ultimately trade no updates. An exchange completes if
both clients execute all four phases or if one of them ends the exchange early as
allowed by the protocol. Peers use TCP to send packets reliably during the ﬁrst
three phases and switch to UDP for the fourth. We discuss this design decision later
when we prove that each balanced exchange is a Nash equilibrium.
In each exchange, we discourage cheating by designing the protocol so that
peers who blatantly cheat are caught and evicted from the system. If the tracker
sees a proof of misbehavior (PoM) against a peer, the tracker removes that peer
from the system. A PoM is a sequence of inconsistent messages signed by a peer.
We intertwine the history and update exchange phases so that blatant cheating
eﬀorts generate PoMs. Each message in our history and update exchanges includes
a cryptographic hash of the previous message sent in the trade: if a client sends a
briefcase whose contents diﬀer from the agreed upon updates of the history exchange,
then the history exchange messages plus the briefcase constitutes a PoM. These
cryptographic hashes are missing from messages in the key exchange phase. We
later explain this omission.
We use the tracker to audit possible PoMs. In every round, the tracker
polices the system by ordering a fraction of random peers to supply suspected PoMs
against other peers. If a queried peer does not have a suspected PoM against another
peer, then it replies with a dummy message. We specify all audit responses to be
of equal size, thereby removing a rational peer’s incentive to cover up PoMs against
others. The tracker treats peers that ignore audit requests as it would peers that
have provably misbehaved. To reduce false positives because of transient network
failures, the tracker allows suﬃcient time for a peer to respond to audit requests.
The auditor evicts a misbehaving peer by sending a signed eviction notice to the
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broadcaster who embeds all eviction notices in every update and stops sending
updates to evicted peers. We discuss in Section 5.1.2 how to bound the overhead of
eviction notices.
In the next section, we prove that each balanced exchange is a Nash equilib-
rium. Our approach to provide this property follows two principles: delayed grati-
ﬁcation and restricted choice. We delay gratiﬁcation to postponse a peer’s receipt
of useful updates until the last phase, thereby forcing rational peers to participate
until the end of a trade. We then restrict choice so that such participation follows
the protocol speciﬁcation. In the next section, we discuss the Balanced Exchange
Protocol in greater detail.
4.2.2 Details
To review, in a protocol that is a Nash equilibrium, rational peers expect no gain
from unilateral deviations. As stated earlier, we assume rational peers only consider
strategies that maximize the number of useful updates received in each exchange
independent of concurrent or future exchanges. The Balanced Exchange Protocol
guarantees the following property:
Theorem 1 If two rational clients participating in a balanced exchange with each
other seek to maximize the utility of that exchange independent of concurrent or
future exchanges, then the Balanced Exchange Protocol is a Nash equilibrium.
In the following sections, we show that each phase of a balanced exchange
is a Nash equilibrium, implying that the whole balanced exchange is also a Nash
equilibrium. In each phase, we show that if a rational peer assumes its peers obey
the protocol, then following the Balanced Exchange protocol is in that peer’s best
interest. Note that the assumption that remaining peers obey the protocol is an
artifact of the Nash equilibria proof technique and is not a requirement of our
protocol.
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We simplify the presentation of the subsequent lemmas and proofs by treating
any client that has issued a POM against itself as evicted. We use the following
property regarding eviction in later proofs and include it here for reference.
Lemma 1 A rational peer S only pursues strategies that ignore evicted peers.
Proof :
1. Suppose for contradiction that there exists an evicted peer R that S does not
ignore.
2. S participates in an exchange with R only if S expects positive utility from
the interaction.
3. Because R has already been evicted, R is Byzantine, as it can be neither
altruistic nor rational
4. S therefore expects negative utility from communicating with R.
5. This reasoning brings the proof to its contradiction in that S expects both
positive and negative utility from communicating with R.
6. Therefore, S ignores all evicted peers.
Phase 1: Partner Selection
The ﬁrst phase, partner selection, highlights a fundamental diﬀerence between tradi-
tional gossip and gossip in a BAR setting. In a traditional gossip protocol, each peer
periodically selects a partner using a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) and
contacts that partner to request an exchange. Each peer also accepts every request
it receives. Random partner selection provides robustness against crashed peers and
link failures. Yet, in a BAR setting, the freedom to choose partners allows ratio-
nal peers to select partners not at random, possibly dissolving gossip’s robustness.
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This vulnerability stems from the non-determinism inherent to random partner se-
lection. Furthermore, malicious peers could attempt to monopolize all gossiping
opportunities.
We eliminate this weakness by replacing the non-deterministic seed, typically
system time, used in PRNGs with a per round deterministic yet unpredictable value.
A peer S uses its signature 〈r,BAL〉S as its seed for round r, where BAL is the string
“BAL”. With this seed, S then deterministically maps numbers generated by the
PRNG to entries in the membership list. S continues looking for entries until it
ﬁnds the ﬁrst non-evicted partner R. This partner selection is deterministic, but
unpredictable because no peer other than S can generate S′s signature for a seed
value. As Figure 4.1 illustrates, to initiate a gossip request to R, S includes the seed
and all eviction notices for peers that S could have selected before deciding on R.
R then determines whether the exchange request is valid.
Deﬁnition 2 A balanced exchange request 〈BAL REQUEST, S,R, seed,#(HS), evict〉S
is valid if and only it it satisﬁes the following conditions:
• The seed is S’s signature of 〈r,BAL〉.
• All included eviction notices are properly signed by the tracker.
• The seeded PRNG selects R as the ﬁrst non-evicted peer.
Note that invalid balanced exchange requests are also PoMs. R accepts a
balanced exchange request if the request is valid, the seed is for the current round,
and this is the ﬁrst time that S has presented this seed value to R. Otherwise, R
ignores the request.
Lemma 2 Rational peers only send gossip requests to and accept gossip requests
from peers as determined by valid requests.
Proof :
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1. A rational peer S may communicate with the targets as sanctioned by the
protocol, an evicted peer, or some other peer.
2. By Lemma 1, S does not send balanced exchange requests to evicted peers.
3. S only sends balanced exchange requests to partners as sanctioned by the
protocol, as it expects other peers to reject inappropriate requests.
4. S rejects balanced exchange requests from peers not sanctioned by the proto-
col, as responding to the request would generate a PoM against S.
5. S therefore only communicates with targets as sanctioned by the protocol.
We note that the argument against peers participating in unsanctioned ex-
changes is buttressed by the speciﬁc tangible concern that such exchanges would
be done without the recourse of sending a PoM to the auditor if either peer in an
exchange were (quite rationally) to cheat its partner by sending a diﬀerent briefcase
than the one agreed upon.
Phase 2: History Exchange
After a peer S selects a partner R, they exchange histories—a history deﬁnes a set of
update ids—using three messages. As Figure 4.1 illustrates, S provides in the ﬁrst
message a hash of its history HS and the PRNG seed value (as discussed earlier)
to R; the hash commits S to send HS to R. After R accepts S’s request to trade
updates, R returns its current history HR. In the ﬁnal message, S divulges its actual
history, HS , to R who checks that HS is consistent with the previously sent hash.
Note that each peer sends a history before learning its partner’s history: S does so
by sending a hash ﬁrst and R by sending its actual history while possessing only an
irreversible hash. This design makes it diﬃcult for a Byzantine peer to maximize
network traﬃc during the update exchange by tailoring a history to its partner’s,
e.g., by responding with a history that is the exact complement of its partner’s.
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Lemma 3 A rational peer S does not divulge a history that does not match the
original hash.
Proof :
1. Suppose S sent a signed message that divulged a history whose hash does not
match the one sent in an exchange request.
2. Together, the request and divulge messages constitute a PoM.
3. Rational peers do not sent PoMs.
Lemma 4 A rational peer S terminates any exchange with a peer R who divulges
a history whose hash does not match the original sent in a request message.
Proof :
1. Suppose S does not terminate the exchange.
2. Because R sends these internally inconsistent messages, R generates a PoM
against itself.
3. S considers R to be an evicted peer since R has generated a PoM against itself.
4. S does not continue communicating with evicted peers.
The restrictions we have imposed on history exchanges forces rational peers
to, in essence, obey the letter of the law. The spirit, however, is that rational peers
report their histories honestly. We now discuss the incentives for a rational peer to
be honest in claiming which updates it has and does not have. Our ﬁrst technique
draws from the principle of balanced cost [3]. We deﬁne all histories to be of equal
size, thereby removing any incentive S may have to save a few bytes by sending
smaller histories. Therefore, when exchanging histories, the only remaining way for
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S to obtain greater utility is by increasing the number of useful updates received by
the end of the exchange.
We show that a rational peer S has no incentive to lie about its history. The
proof relies on two lemmas. The ﬁrst lemma states that S should not lie about
missing any updates. The second states that any situation in which S beneﬁts
from claiming to have more than it actually does also requires S to risk eviction.
Together, these two lemmas imply that S should be honest in reporting its history.
Lemma 5 Consider a rational peer S, its history HS, and an unexpired update
U ∈ HS. If S participates in an exchange, then S expects nothing to gain from
claiming to not possess U , i.e., reporting a history H ′S such that U /∈ H ′S.
Proof :
1. Recall that the number of updates to be exchanged k is the minimum of how
many updates each party reports that it has that the other reports it does
not.
2. Suppose that S reports H ′S as its history.
3. We consider two cases: S’s partner either possesses U or does not.
4. If S’s partner does not have U , then S can only keep k the same or increase
k by claiming to have U .
5. If S’s partner does have U , then it is possible that S can increase k by 1
6. However, if k increases, it means that S would expect to receive U again
Lemma 6 Consider a rational peer S, its history HS, and an unexpired update
U /∈ HS. Any exchange in which S beneﬁts from reporting a history H ′S, such that
U ∈ H ′S, requires S to upload U .
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Proof :
1. Again, k is the minimum number of how many updates each party reports
that it has that the other does not.
2. Suppose that S reports a H ′S as its history
3. We consider two cases: S’s partner either possesses U or does not.
4. If S’s partner possesses U , then by being honest and not claiming to have U ,
S either increases k or leaves k unchanged.
5. If S’s partner does not possess U , then by being honest, S risks decreasing k
by 1.
6. Note that k is decreased only if S would be obligated to upload U as part of
the exchange.
7. However, S does not possess U and claiming to upload it in a briefcase would
generate a PoM, something that rational peers do not do.
Phase 3: Update Exchange
After the history exchange commits S and R to sending the k most recent updates
each possesses but the other lacks, S and R send the corresponding updates in signed
briefcase messages. Each briefcase contains i) the seed identifying this exchange,
ii) a plaintext description of k update ids, and iii) the corresponding k updates
encrypted with the hash of both the sender’s private key and the exchange’s seed
value. The sender signs the briefcase, promising that the encrypted contents match
the description. If either the received briefcase’s seed value does not match the
seed identifying this exchange or the briefcase’s update list does not match the k
expected updates, the receiver aborts the exchange without sending its decryption
key.
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Lemma 7 Rational peers do not send briefcases that contain inappropriate seed
values or inappropriate plaintext descriptions.
Proof :
1. Suppose that a rational peer S includes either the wrong seed value or the
wrong plaintext description in a briefcase message.
2. S expects its partner to reject the briefcase and abandon the exchange.
3. S’s action is therefore not rational.
Lemma 8 Rational peers reject briefcases that contain inappropriate seed values or
inappropriate plaintext descriptions.
Proof :
1. Suppose that a rational peer S accepts a briefcase with either a wrong seed
value or wrong plaintext description.
2. Such a briefcase along with the previous history messages constitutes a PoM
against the sender of the briefcase.
3. S therefore considers its partner an evicted peer.
4. S does not communicate with evicted peers.
Lemma 9 If a rational peer S sends a briefcase message, then the encrypted con-
tents correspond to the briefcase’s plaintext description.
Proof :
1. Suppose that a rational peer S sends a briefcase whose contents diﬀer from
the plaintext description.
2. Such a briefcase constitutes a PoM.
3. Yet, S is rational and does not send PoMs.
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Key Exchange
A peer who is satisﬁed with its partner’s briefcase enters the key exchange phase.
In this phase, the peer sends via UDP a key request that contains the seed value
used to initiate the exchange. A peer replies to a key request with a response that
contains that peer’s seed-speciﬁc decryption key.
As redundant as it may seem to read, the goal of the key exchange phase is for
peers to actually exchange keys. There should be no expected beneﬁt for a rational
peer to withold its key. However, as with the exchange of any items, guaranteeing
fairness requires a trusted third party [25, 59], where fairness means that either both
peers in a balanced exchange obtain what they are seeking or neither peer does.
Introducing a third party to mediate potentially every exchange can be a
bottleneck at large-scales. We therefore design a mechanism that allows altruistic
and rational peers to trade keys without concern that these peers will attempt to
cheat. The linchpin in providing the incentives for exchanging key is to use a credible
threat. A peer repeatedly sends key requests, up to some constant number of times,
until it obtains a key response from its partner. Note that it is possible to tune the
size of key requests to oﬀset any asymmetry between download and upload capacity.
Lemma 10 If a rational peer S replies to a key request, then S′s response contains
the appropriate symmetric key.
Proof :
1. Suppose that S sends a key response with an inappropriate key.
2. S’s partner discards the response and acts as if S never sent the message.
3. Therefore, S wasted the eﬀort in sending its response, an action that rational
peers do not indulge.
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Lemma 11 If a rational peer S does not receive a key response from its partner R,
S resends its key request.
Proof :
1. Suppose S does not send the key request.
2. S then does not expect to get a key to decrypt updates received from R, and
gets no beneﬁt from this exchange.
3. Recall that S is rational.
4. If S were to resend the request, S would expect to get a response, decrypt
updates, and beneﬁt from the exchange.
5. S therefore sends the request.
The ﬁnal lemma states that S will indeed respond to key responses from R.
The proof relies on the unpredictability of exchanging messages over an unreliable
channel. By using UDP to exchange keys, we take advantage of S′s uncertainty
in guessing whether R will send further key requests. More concretely, if S is
certain with probability p that R is ﬁnished sending key requests, then R′s key
requests should be at least a factor of cucd(1−p) as large as key responses, where cu
and cd are the costs of uploading and downloading a single byte, respectively. In our
implementation, we assume that S always believes another key request will arrive,
p = 0.
Lemma 12 If S is certain with probability p that R has sent its last key request,
then S replies to R′s requests provided that those requests are more than a factor of
cu
cd(1−p) as large as key responses.
Proof :
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1. Suppose S ignores a key request from R and therefore saves the cost, cu ×
response-size, of sending a key response.
2. S expects to receive a key request from R with probability 1− p, which would
cost cd × request-size to download.
3. S therefore expects to incur (1 − p)(cd × request-size) cost from ignoring
R’s earlier request, which is greater than S′s savings of cu × response-size,
as requests are more than a factor of cucd(1−p) as large as response.
4. Recall that S is rational and deviates only if doing so increases expected utility.
5. Therefore, it is irrational for S to ignore R′s key request.
4.3 Discussion
The Balanced Exchange protocol is the result of our eﬀorts to create a protocol for
which cooperation is in a rational peer’s best interest. To enforce that cooperation
and retain the robustness inherent to gossip protocols, we design a veriﬁable pseudo-
random partner selection algorithm and a novel fair enough exchange mechanism.
These contributions let us construct a gossip protocol founded on an appealing
solution concept, Nash equilibria.
However, Balanced Exchange’s theoretical attractiveness is diluted by its
practical shortcomings. We simulate 500 peers using Balanced Exchange to trade
updates. In our simulation, the broadcaster sends 50 updates to 25 random peers
in every round. Each update expires 10 rounds from the round in which it was sent.
In Figure 4.2, we plot the average percentage of updates a peer misses and show
that peers miss over 1% of updates sent by a broadcaster1. This small deﬁcit is a
1Additionally, we see that reliability improves with time and levels oﬀ after approximately 30
rounds. This improvement is because there is more diversity in updates for later rounds, resulting
in more eﬀective bilateral trades.
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Figure 4.2: Percentage of updates missed on a round by round basis. Note that on
this graph we use a log-scale y-axis and that a curve closer to the x-axis is desirable.
consequence of restricting data dissemination to exactly balanced trades. Although
small, this unreliability introduces several noticeable artifacts in a video stream. In
the next chapter, we explore how to augment the Balanced Exchange protocol to
address this performance concern.
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Chapter 5
BAR Gossip: Making it Work
In this chapter, we augment Balanced Exchange to yield BAR Gossip, the ﬁrst
p2p live streaming system that tolerates both Byzantine and rational peers. BAR
Gossip consists of two protocols: Balanced Exchange and Optimistic Push. In the
previous chapter, we presented Balanced Exchange, which enables rational peers to
trade updates with one another in a provably fair manner. However, while fair-
ness is desirable, Balanced Exchange achieves it while sacriﬁcing performance (see
Figure 4.2). BAR Gossip’s second half, Optimistic Push, addresses Balanced Ex-
change’s practical shortcomings.
This second protocol oﬀers another avenue for peers to trade updates. The
main diﬀerence between the two protocols is that an optimistic push lets a peer
trade updates with the hope, rather than the certainty, that a peer will receive
an equal number of updates in return. Although we show that optimistic pushes
address practical shortcomings, they have a theoretical drawback: We cannot prove
that the Optimistic Push protocol is a Nash equilibrium, although our experiments
suggest it is not easy to cheat.
In our evaluation, we demonstrate that Balanced Exchange and Optimistic
Push can together achieve 99.9% reliability, surpassing Balanced Exchange’s 98.7%.
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We also assess how robust Optimistic Push is to attempts at cheating. Finally, we
examine how resilient BAR Gossip is to colluding and Byzantine behaviors.
5.1 Design
The Balanced Exchange protocol’s strength is also its weakness. We crafted each
balanced exchange so that a non-Byzantine peer could trade a set of updates for
an equal number of updates. This design works well if peers can consistently ﬁnd
partners who have the right set of updates—an exact complement is ideal. If a peer
has little to oﬀer in an exchange with its partner, then few updates would be traded.
Although uncommon, these occurrences make it more likely that a peer will
fail to deliver updates before they expire. Worse, when a peer begins to fall behind
in acquiring updates, it becomes harder for that peer to get caught up since every
exchange is balanced. This observation suggests that a second way to trade updates
may be useful, one that allows peers that have fallen behind to quickly obtain missing
updates than can be used in future trades.
5.1.1 Optimistic Push
The Optimistic Push Protocol provides a safety net for peers to acquire missing
updates without giving back a set of updates of equivalent value. Optimistic pushes
follow the same structure as balanced exchanges; we provide Figure 5.1 for reference.
Partner selection is nearly identical. In round r, peer S uses 〈r,OPT〉S to seed
the PRNG and selects a partner R in the same way as in the Balanced Exchange
protocol.
The main diﬀerence between Balanced Exchange and Optimistic Push lies
in what the parties disclose to each other during the history exchange phase and
in how they determine the content of their respective briefcases during the update
exchange phase. To exchange histories, S sends to R two lists: a young list and an old
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Optimistic Push Protocol
Sender (S) Receiver (R)
seed = <round, OPT>S
check: seed is valid
PRNG(seed) maps to R
k = min( | want |, pushsize )
check: upd_list matches check: upd_list' matches
check: {u1, ...., uk}KSR
 check: {u'1, ...., u'k}KRS
 
buff = buff U  {u1, ...., uk}  
KSR = #(          , seed)K
priv
S KRS = #(           , seed)K
priv
R<BRIEFCASE, S, R, seed, upd_list, {u1, ...., uk}KSR,
#M
R
>
S
<BRIEFCASE, R, S, seed, upd_list', {u'1, ...., u'k}KRS,
#M
S
>
R
<KEY_REQUEST, S, R, seed>
S
<KEY_REQUEST, R, S, seed>
R
<KEY_RESPONSE, S, R, seed, KSR 
>
S
<KEY_RESPONSE, R, S, seed, KRS>R
buff = buff U  {u'1, ...., u'k}  
TCP
UDP
<OPT_RESPONSE, R, S, seed, want, #MS>R
<OPT_REQUEST, S, R, young, old, evict>S
want = young - HR
Figure 5.1: Optimistic Push Protocol for client S contacting client R.
list. The young list identiﬁes the most recent updates that S possesses. The old list
identiﬁes updates that S still needs and that are about to expire. When S initiates an
optimistic push, S hopes to obtain updates from its old list in exchange for uploading
updates from the young list. This hope is precisely what makes optimistic pushes
optimistic. S′s partner, R, has the option to upload fewer stream updates from the
old list than it requests from the young list. It is this ﬂexibility to obtain stream
updates while uploading (possibly) fewer stream updates in return that allows a
peer who may have fallen behind to quickly catch up with the rest of the system.
More concretely, after R receives the young and old lists from S, R replies
with a want list that contains update identiﬁers from the young list that R is missing.
S and R then exchange briefcases. S′s briefcase contains the updates identiﬁed by
the want list along with an appropriate plaintext description of the update ids. In
contrast, R includes in its briefcase as many updates from the old list as possible
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without exceeding the number of updates R wants from the young list. If R has
not reached the limit of how many updates it can include in the briefcase, it makes
up the diﬀerence with junk updates. Furthermore, the plaintext description on R′s
briefcase does not identify the exact contained updates, only how many items are
inside, each of which can either be junk or from the old list.
We emphasize that junk updates are crafted to be larger than stream up-
dates. If junk updates were smaller, Optimistic Push would encourage rational peers
to deviate from Balanced Exchange because updates might be had for cheaper in
Optimistic Push.
We regulate Optimistic Push with two parameters, push age and push size:
the young list consists only of update ids that have been broadcast within the last
push age rounds and push size is an upper limit on the number of updates that
the receiver can place in its want list. Larger values of push size help lagging peers
catch up faster; however, they also increase the likelihood that such peers will waste
bandwidth by sending junk.
The Optimistic Push Protocol follows nearly the same steps as the Balanced
Exchange Protocol. Peers select partners in a veriﬁable and pseudo-random manner,
exchange histories, swap encrypted updates, and divulge decryption keys. Like
Balanced Exchange, this trading structure greatly limits the ways in which a rational
peer could cheat. Unlike Balanced Exchange, the extra ﬂexbility aﬀorded by junk
updates makes faithful participation less certain. For example, a rational peer may
disingenuously claim to be missing an update so as to reduce the expected number
of received junk updates. Worse, rational peers may choose to deviate from the
Optimistic Push protocol by simply not participating, never initiating pushes but
responding to them, or sending junk updates in lieu of useful updates.
We have been unable to prove whether a rational peer would obey or disobey
the Optimistic Push protocol. The obstacle is the diﬃculty in accurately model-
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ing what a rational peer expects in a setting involving hundreds of peers making
pseudo-random choices to trade hundreds of updates. Traditionally, researchers have
taken approaches to simplify the analysis by only considering how a single update
spreads [10, 23]. In BAR Gossip though, how one update spreads is dependent on
how other updates spread; updates are traded. At the end of the previous chapter,
Figure 4.2 illustrates how these interdependencies aﬀect Balanced Exchange. In the
absence of a theoretical proof for obedience, we turn to more empirical methods.
Later in this chapter, we include experimental evidence which suggests that despite
the gains possible from cheating, realizing those gains is not easy.
5.1.2 Optimizations
We now describe four optimizations that increase the practicality of BAR Gossip.
Our optimizations focus on limiting the bandwidth used by the protocol as so far
explained.
1. We cap the number of balanced exchanges and optimistic pushes that a peer
accepts in any round. As with all gossip protocols, random selection distributes
load across participating peers. Occasionally, however, that randomness may
overwhelm some peers that by chance are selected by many peers at once.
We use the standard heuristic that each peer accepts requests up to some per
round maximum and ignores further requests that round [10, 21].
2. We reign in bandwidth spikes by allowing each peer to limit the number of
updates that are actually swapped in a balanced exchange. This heuristic is
similar to the Round Retransmission Limit technique proposed in Bimodal
Multicast [10]. A peer limits the number of updates traded in balanced ex-
changes by including a cap when reporting its history. The actual number of
updates exchanged is therefore the minimum of each peer’s reported cap and
the most number of updates that can be traded in a balanced manner.
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3. We limit the overhead of eviction notices by having the broadcaster embed
each notice into a constant number of updates. More concretely, when the
broadcaster learns of an eviction, it embeds a notice in one update every
round for r′ > 0 rounds. With high probability, every peer learns of an
eviction within deadline +r′ rounds.
4. We reduce overhead further by letting peers elide old eviction notices from gos-
sip requests. An eviction notice is old if the peer it refers to was evicted more
than deadline+r′ rounds ago. Since every peer possesses each old eviction
notice with high probability, peers can verify whether others select partners
appropriately.
5.2 Evaluation
BAR Gossip is a robust p2p streaming protocol capable of providing stable and
reliable throughput. We evaluate BAR Gossip through experiments and simulations,
denoting ﬁgures derived from simulation data with ‘[sim]’. Our evaluation consists
of four parts.
1. We examine how rational activity hurts traditional gossip protocols so as to
understand BAR Gossip’s impact of curbing rational deviations.
2. We explore ways that a rational peer may attempt to cheat in BAR Gossip
and show BAR Gossip discourages such attempts.
3. We demonstrate BAR Gossip is robust to rational peers who may collude.
4. We show BAR Gossip tolerates up to 20% of peers being Byzantine.
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Protocol Parameter Simulation Prototype
ups per round (updates) 100 98-101
deadline (rounds) 10 10
push size (updates) 20 20
push age (updates) 3 3
junk cost 1.39 1.39
seed frac 5% 5%
# Peers 500 45
Table 5.1: Parameter settings used in simulations and prototype experiments.
5.2.1 Methodology
Several parameters regulate the Balanced Exchange and Optimistic Push Proto-
cols. The broadcaster multicasts ups per round updates per round and sends each
update to a fraction seed frac of random peers. Each update expires deadline
rounds after it was multicast. In optimistic pushes, push age denotes the maximum
age of updates sent in the young list, while push size is the maximum length of the
want list. The ratio of junk update size to real update size is junk cost> 1. Ta-
ble 6.4.2 provides the values for these parameters for our simulation and prototype
experiments.
For our prototype evaluations, we implement BAR Gossip in Python to
stream an MPEG-4 video [65]. We recorded a 200 Kbps UDP video stream at
30 frames per second using Quicktime Broadcaster with one key frame every 60
frames. Quicktime Broadcaster generates UDP datagrams for the broadcast with
an average size of 179 bytes (σ = 62), resulting in 116–131 datagrams per second.
Our broadcaster, auditor, and peers are a mix of 45 600 MHz and 850 MHz
Emulab machines sharing a 100 Mbps Ethernet subnet, conﬁgured with a 100ms
end-to-end latency and 1% probability of any packet being dropped. The broad-
caster reads the recorded video from disk, encapsulates two to three Quicktime
UDP datagrams into an update, pads every update to the same size (640 bytes),
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and unicasts each update using UDP to three 3 random peers. Peers then exchange
updates as in Figures 4.1 and 5.1. A peer delivers an update by extracting the
contained datagrams and sending them to the local Quicktime player that displays
the video content. We use MD5 to compute cryptographic hashes, 128 bit RSA keys
with full domain hashing [8] to create unique signatures and the Mersenne Twister
algorithm [51] to generate pseudo-random numbers. Each peer accepts at most 6 re-
quests for balanced exchanges and optimistic pushes. Additionally, each peer limits
to 100 the number of updates it uploads in balanced exchanges for any given round,
parceling 50 to the ﬁrst balanced exchange in which it participates, 25 to the next,
and so on.
In the following sections we measure the reliability (expressed as the per-
centage of updates received by the deadline), jitter (measured as the percentage of
rounds in which any update missed its deadline), and bandwidth characteristics of
BAR Gossip. Unless otherwise noted, measurements in simulations are averaged
over 100 rounds and using the prototype are averaged over 180 rounds across 15
trials.
5.2.2 Traditional Gossip
We now compare BAR Gossip against two traditional gossip protocols, push-pull
and pull-only. The push-pull protocol is very similar to Balanced Exchange: a
peer randomly selects a partner in every round, exchanges histories, and then swaps
updates. The key diﬀerence is that peers swaps all updates that either peer possesses
but for which the other peer does not. The peer who initiates the gossip exchange
pushes updates to its partners and pulls updates from its partner. As its name
implies, a pull-only gossip protocol sends updates in only one direction, towards the
peer who initiates the exchange.
While pushing and pulling may disseminate data faster than just pulling,
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the pull-only protocol is more eﬃcient. A peer using the pull-only protocol receives
updates from exactly one source in every round, compared to multiple sources in
the push-pull gossip protocol. The pull-only version thereby wastes less bandwidth
by never having peers receive redundant updates. Several researchers have taken
advantage of the eﬃciency inherent to pull-only gossip techniques in building p2p
live streaming systems [33, 60].
We now demonstrate that these gossip protocols, although robust in the
settings for which they were designed, are ill-suited for a BAR environment. In
particular, we examine each protocol’s reliability and bandwidth usage in the pres-
ence of rational peers who choose to not upload any data to their partners. Note
that this evaluation is conservative, as there is nothing that prevents a rational peer
from initiating many more exchanges than normal to obtain even more updates for
free. Furthermore, a single malicious peer could severely impair either a push-pull or
pull-only protocol by monopolizing all trading opportunities. In the following simu-
lations, we do not incorporate optimizations into BAR Gossip to reduce bandwidth
that are present in the prototype.
Figures 5.2 and 5.3 plot the reliability seen and upload bandwidth used,
respectively, by an altruistic peer as the proportion of rational peers in the system
increases. While BAR Gossip’s lines remain relatively constant in both graphs,
push-pull’s and pull-only’s lines degrade noticeably.
Figure 5.2 shows that the push-pull protocol achieves comparable reliability
to BAR Gossip when up to approximately 50% of the peers in the system are ratio-
nal. Afterwards, push-pull’s reliability drops dramatically. The pull-only protocol
behaves similarly, maintaining near perfect reliability until approximately 30% of
the peers are rational. However, the robustness seen in push-pull and push-only
does not come for free.
Both push-pull and pull-only tolerate rational activity by shifting the burden
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Figure 5.2: [sim] Reliability experienced by an altruistic peer using a traditional
push-pull gossip protocol, a pull-only gossip protocol, and BAR Gossip.
to altruistic peers. Figure 5.3 shows the average upload bandwidth of altruistic peers
rising as the fraction of rational peers also increases. The decline in bandwidth
occurs when altruistic peers obtain fewer and fewer updates to spread since rational
peers are neglecting to spread any updates.
Note that the rise in bandwidth experienced by altruistic peers in traditional
gossip represents dangerous negative reinforcement: as more rational peers choose to
cheat, the remaining altruistic peers are punished with increased bandwidth load,
encouraging them also to defect until reliability collapses. BAR Gossip exhibits
robustness to rational behavior with steady reliability and bandwidth measurements.
Although BAR Gossip clearly outperforms both push-pull and push-only
when rational behavior is widespread, it may be worthwhile to consider when tra-
ditional gossip techniques may be preferred over BAR Gossip. Figures 5.2 and 5.3
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Figure 5.3: [sim] Send bandwidth used by an altruistic peer using traditional gossip
versus BAR Gossip.
show that when rational peers comprise approximately 30% or more of the system,
BAR Gossip is as reliable as push-pull and more reliable than pull-only. BAR Gossip
consumes less bandwidth than push-pull at this point, as well. When rational peers
make up less than 30% of the total peer population, a pull-only protocol is a bet-
ter option than both BAR Gossip and push-only, as pull-only provides comparable
reliability while wasting less bandwidth.
5.2.3 Unilateral Rational Deviation
We now examine deviant strategies that a rational peer might pursue. In our ex-
periments, a rational peer pursues these strategies while the remaining peers obey
the protocol. This approach is the experimental analog to the standard Nash equi-
librium proof technique.
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Strategy Accepts Optimistic Push Initiates Optimistic Push Returns
Proactive/Data Yes Yes Data
Proactive/Junk Yes Yes Junk
Proactive/Decline No Yes None
Passive/Data Yes No Data
Passive/Junk Yes No Junk
Passive/Decline No No None
Table 5.2: Six strategies a rational peer may follow with regards to the Optimistic
Push Protocol.
In this analysis, we make the following simplifying assumption. A rational
peer’s primary concern is to improve the delivered stream’s quality by maximizing
reliability and minimizing jitter; minimizing consumed bandwidth is a subordinate
goal. We now consider the choices available to a rational peer with respect to
Optimistic Push.
Table 5.2 lists the ﬁve strategies we consider that a rational peer may pursue
to deviate from the Optimistic Push Protocol. Proactive strategies dictate that a ra-
tional peer initiates optimistic pushes as speciﬁed by the Optimistic Push Protocol.
In contrast, passive strategies specify to never initiate optimistic pushes. Data, junk,
and decline strategies prescribe that rational peers responding to an optimistic push
send useful updates (when possible), send as much junk as allowed, or decline the ex-
change, respectively. Note that following the Optimistic Push Protocol corresponds
to the Proactive/Data strategy.
Figure 5.4 plots the average probability the rational peer is missing each
update as a function of time since that update was multicast by the broadcaster. We
show how eﬀective each strategy is in acquiring updates before they expire—lower
lines corresponding to more eﬀective strategies. Table 5.3 provides the corresponding
jitter for each strategy.
Taken together, Figure 5.4 and Table 5.3 imply that rational peers should
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Figure 5.4: Average probability of the rational peer missing each update for diﬀerent
strategies.
Strategy Average Jitter Standard Deviation
Proactive/Data 0.48% 1.16%
Proactive/Junk 0.32% 0.78%
Proactive/Decline 11.59% 6.22%
Passive/Data 18.10% 6.08%
Passive/Junk 14.76% 9.44%
Passive/Decline 47.94% 7.52%
Table 5.3: Jitter that the rational peer experiences while pursuing diﬀerent strate-
gies.
follow either proactive/data or proactive/junk strategies. This is perhaps unsurpris-
ing, given that proactive strategies perform additional exchanges likely to result in
more deliverable updates than passive strategies.
Figure 5.5 breaks the tie between the proactive/data and proactive/junk
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Figure 5.5: Rational peer’s consumed bandwidth for diﬀerent strategies.
strategies. The proactive/data strategy uses approximately 300 Kbps of upload
bandwidth compared to proactive/junk’s 317 Kbps. This diﬀerence is not an acci-
dent: we have designed BAR Gossip with junk cost> 1 so that rational peers prefer
ﬁlling their briefcases with valuable updates, rather than junk, whenever possible.
From these experiments, we conclude that a rational peer, when surrounded
by other peers that follow BAR Gossip, has no obvious incentive for deviation—in
fact, quite the contrary. While our experiments clearly fall short of proving that
BAR Gossip as a whole (Balanced Exchange plus Optimistic Push) constitutes a
Nash equilibrium, it does suggest that a Nash equilibrium is likely to be found at
or near the strategy that corresponds to BAR Gossip. For instance, while we are
unable to prove that there are no beneﬁcial hybrid strategies that, depending on the
environment, switch between two or more of the six strategies we have considered, it
appears that the beneﬁt of a proactive strategy derives from consistently participat-
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ing in more exchanges, making it unlikely that switching occasionally to a passive
strategy would provide a net gain. As for switching among proactive strategies,
it yields no change in beneﬁt while changing bandwidth costs, also providing little
room for improvement.
5.2.4 Rational Collusion
Although a rational peer may ﬁnd it diﬃcult to beneﬁt from cheating on its own,
multiple rational peers can coordinate their actions to increase collective utility. We
explore the eﬀect of such collusion through simulations assessing the impact such a
group may have on peers obeying the protocol.
We assume that colluding and non-colluding rational peers share a utility
function. We also assume that colluding peers run a private protocol to disseminate
updates among themselves. This protocol may be an alternative BAR protocol or it
may be a non-BAR protocol bolstered by a high level of trust among colluding peers.
We simulate a perfect collusion scenario in which every colluding peer immediately
broadcasts new updates within the group at no cost. This source of updates reduces
the incentive to fully participate in the BARGossip protocol. In particular, colluding
peers only participate in balanced exchanges.
Figure 5.6 shows how the size of a perfect collusion group aﬀects the quality
of the stream seen by a peer following BAR Gossip. The intuition for the degraded
performance is i) a non-colluding peer trades little when participating in a balanced
exchange with a colluding peer and ii) colluding peers do not participate in opti-
mistic pushes. In perfect collusion groups, colluding peers get most of their updates
for free from other colluding peers, reducing their contributions to the rest of the
system.
We ﬁnd that when the collusion group size reaches 50% of the participants,
other peers see an average convergence of 93% for an update, resulting in an unusable
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Figure 5.6: [sim] Eﬀect of collusion on an altruistic peer’s reliability when colluding
peers are following the passive/decline strategy.
stream. Although near-perfect collusion among small groups seems plausible, it
is unclear that collusion on a large scale is a signiﬁcant threat. As the colluding
group grows, so do the challenges of coordinating and trusting peers. Ironically, as a
colluding group grows, it might require BAR Gossip to distribute updates internally
as trust begins to break down among members.
5.2.5 Byzantine Impact
While we entice rational peers to behave correctly, we should also limit the impact
of Byzantine actions on good users of the system. In these experiments, we focus
our attention on Byzantine peers who exploit the messages and behaviors allowed
by our protocol so as to harm the other peers in the system.
In BAR Gossip, Byzantine peers cannot subvert the system’s safety prop-
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erties. Because the broadcaster signs each update, Byzantine peers cannot unde-
tectably tamper with the contents of any delivered update. Such peers can, however,
impair progress by sending two kinds of messages: non-protocol messages and proto-
col messages. We regard generic DoS attacks based on non-protocol messages (e.g.
bandwidth or connection ﬂooding) as outside the scope of this work.
We design BAR Gossip to be robust against protocol-based attacks on live-
ness even if initiated by a signiﬁcant number of Byzantine peers. First, BAR Gos-
sip’s partner selection protocol limits how many partners a peer can contact in a
round—unlike traditional gossip, where a Byzantine node could potentially con-
tact an unlimited number of nodes and involve them in useless exchanges. Second,
Byzantine peers can inﬂict limited damage in the exchanges in which they partic-
ipate. A Byzantine peer can remain silent during an exchange to slow the spread
of updates, but fortunately, gossip protocols are naturally resilient to benign fail-
ures. One remaining concern is that a Byzantine peer could impact liveness by
luring its partners into expensive message exchanges that ultimately fail in helping
to disseminate updates.
We examine this kind of attack in the next set of experiemnts. During
balanced exchanges and optimistic pushes, Byzantine peers report histories to max-
imize the number of updates that would be exchanged. For a balanced exchange,
a Byzantine peer reports a history that is an exact complement of its partner’s.
For an optimistic push, a Byzantine peer announces a full young list and an empty
old list if initiating, and requests the entire young list if receiving. Byzantine peers
never enter the update or key exchange phases, so as not to generate a PoM, but
still inducing its partner to devote signiﬁcant bandwidth to the exchange without
receiving any beneﬁt. The presence of Byzantine peers can be viewed as an increase
in the overhead associated with the environment as the costs associated with Byzan-
tine peers depends upon the probability of entering an exchange with a Byzantine
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Figure 5.7: Rational peer’s reliability for diﬀerent strategies.
peer.
To mitigate the eﬀects of this attack, non-Byzantine peers could refuse to
participate in exchanges with peers who have historically been unreliable partners.
We ignore such cat-and-mouse tactics and assess the impact of the above attack
when non-Byzantine peers forget about previous unproductive exchanges.
Figures 5.7 and 5.8 show the reliability seen and bandwidth used, respec-
tively, by a rational peer pursuing each strategy in the presence of diﬀerent pro-
portions of Byzantine peers. The remaining non-Byzantine peers are altruistic.
The choice of strategies is similar to Section 5.2.3 where we considered unilateral
deviation with no Byzantine peers. We elide proactive/decline and passive/decline
strategies in which rational peers decline to participate in optimistic pushes, as these
strategies performed signiﬁcantly worse than the other strategies in the absence of
Byzantine behavior. Passive and proactive strategies deliver unwatchable video
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Figure 5.8: Rational peer’s consumed bandwidth for diﬀerent strategies.
streams when the proportion of Byzantine peers reaches 10% and 30%, respectively.
We conclude that among the strategies available, a rational peer should obey
the protocol, i.e. pursue the proactive/data strategy, regardless of the presence of
Byzantine peers. If all non-Byzantine peers are following the protocol, with a system
comprised of 20% Byzantine peers, the bandwidth costs remain relatively constant
while the convergence suﬀers by less than 7%.
5.3 Discussion
BAR Gossip is the ﬁrst p2p live streaming system robust to Byzantine peers and
rational peers. Its successes in a BAR setting, however, are reduced by its practical
and theoretical limitations.
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High overheads To stream a 200 Kbps video, peers upload approximately 300
Kbps on average to their neighbors. A signiﬁcant fraction of this overhead stems
from signatures on every message and receiving redundant stream updates. Fur-
thermore, the Optimistic Push Protocol requires peers to waste network bandwidth
in the form of junk data, a technique used in both BAR-B [3] and Equicast [38].
Static membership It is unclear how to design mechanisms to allow peers to
join and leave the system without disrupting the properties of Nash equilibria. In
a dynamic system, peers may deviate shortly before leaving if there are beneﬁts to
such actions.
Indeﬁnite end time We assume that a streaming event ends at an indeﬁnite time
to eliminate end-game strategies in which peers may attempt to cheat at the end
of a game because doing so is less risky than cheating at the beginning or middle.
These end-game strategies pose a classic shortcoming of game theory—a limitation
that is troubling given that many live events have well-known and published end
times.
Short-sighted strategies Our proof that Balanced Exchange is a Nash equilib-
rium requires that rational peers only pursue strategies to maximize the number of
useful updates traded in each exchange. We ignore more sophisticated strategies
that may take into account the consequences of concurrent or future exchanges.
Partial Guarantees Our evaluation of Optimistic Push suggests that rational
peers have little to gain from attempting to deviate unilaterally. However, those
experiments fall short of proving that Optimistic Push is a Nash equilibrium. In
essence, we sacriﬁce the purist approach of Balanced Exchange so as to achieve
adequate performance in the form of BAR Gossip.
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In addition to highlighting weaknesses of BAR Gossip, the above limitations re-
ﬂect a broader frustration with formal approaches toward p2p system design. The
resulting systems, BAR Gossip included, have been ineﬃcient and have relied on
strong assumptions. In the next chapter of this dissertation, we remove these limi-
tations and show that rigor can also be practical.
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Chapter 6
FlightPath
This chapter resolves the tension in p2p systems between designing practical in-
centives for cooperation and rigorously justifying that those incentives are enough.
We propose approximate equilibria [15] as a new way to design p2p systems. Using
these equilibria, we can design robust mechanisms to tolerate Byzantine peers. More
importantly, approximate equilibria guide how we design systems to incentivize obe-
dience while providing enough ﬂexibility to implement practical solutions. We use
this new approach to design FlightPath, a p2p live streaming system inspired by
BAR Gossip, but fundamentally diﬀerent because of how we take advantage of the
ﬂexibility aﬀorded by not requiring a strict solution.
In FlightPath speciﬁcally, approximate equilibria let us use run-time adap-
tations to tame the randomness of our gossip-based protocol, making it suitable
for low jitter media streaming while retaining the robustness and load balancing of
traditional gossip. The key techniques enabled by this ﬂexibility include allowing
a bounded imbalance between peers, redirecting load away from busy peers, avoid-
ing trades with unhelpful peers, and arithmetic coding of data to increase trading
opportunities.
As a result of these dynamic adaptations, FlightPath is a highly eﬃcient and
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robust media streaming service that has several attractive properties:
High quality streaming: FlightPath provides good service to every peer, not just
good average service. In experiments with over 500 peers, 98% of peers deliver
every packet of an hour long video. No peer misses more than 6 seconds.
Broad deployability: FlightPath uses a novel block selection algorithm to cap the
peak upload bandwidth so that the protocol is accessible to users behind cable
or ADSL connections.
Rational-tolerant: FlightPath is a 110 -Nash equilibrium under a reasonable cost
model, meaning that rational peers have provably little incentive to deviate
from the protocol. We deﬁne an -Nash equilibrium in the next section.
Byzantine-tolerant: FlightPath provides good streaming quality despite 10% of
peers acting maliciously to disrupt it.
Churn-resilient: FlightPath maintains good streaming quality while over 30% of
the peer population may churn every minute. Further, it easily absorbs ﬂash
crowds and sudden peer departures.
Compared to BAR Gossip, the above properties represent both a qualitative
and quantitative improvement. We reduce jitter by several orders of magnitude and
decrease overhead by 50%. Additionally, we allow peers to join and leave the system
without disrupting service.
Although approximate equilibria provide weaker guarantees than strict ones,
they can be achieved without relying on the strong assumptions needed by the ex-
isting systems that implement strict Nash equilibria. BAR Gossip assumes that
rational participants only pursue short-sighted strategies, ignoring more sophisti-
cated ones that might pay oﬀ in the long term. Equicast [38] assumes that a user is
hurt by an inﬁnite amount if it loses any packet of a stream. FlightPath does away
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with such assumptions, relying instead on the existence of a threshold below which
few rational peers ﬁnd it worthwhile to deviate.
We organize the rest of this chapter as follows. Section 6.1 deﬁnes -Nash
equilibria and additonal assumptions we make. Section 6.2 describes FlightPath’s
basic trading protocol, discusses how to add ﬂexibility to improve performance signif-
icantly, and explains how to handle churn. We evaluate our prototype in Section 6.3,
which looks at FlightPath in a static setting, with churn, and under attack. In Sec-
tion 6.4, we analyze the incentives a rational peer may have to cheat and show under
what conditions FlightPath is a 110 -Nash equilibrium.
6.1 Assumptions
We analyze and evaluate FlightPath using -Nash equilibria.
Deﬁnition 3 A protocol is an ex ante -Nash equilibrium if it deﬁnes a strategy
proﬁle such that each rational player expects to gain at most a factor of  from
deviating unilaterally. More formally, a strategy proﬁle s = (s0, . . . , sn) is an ex
ante -Nash equilibrium if for every player i there exists no strategy s∗i such that i
expects utility ui(s−i, s∗i ) > (1 + )ui(s) from following s∗i 1.
Again, we elide “ex ante” for brevity. Within the framework of -Nash equi-
libria, we assume that rational peers deviate if and only if they expect to beneﬁt
by more than a factor of  from deviating unilaterally. This assumption is reason-
able as switching protocols incurs a non-trivial cost such as eﬀort to develop a new
algorithm, work to install new software, or risk that new software will be buggy or
malicious. Under such circumstances, it may not be worth the trouble to develop
1As Chien et al. [15] note, an alternative notion of -Nash equilibria is based on  being an
additive component instead of a factor. They observe that both are equally natural, although
treating  as a factor is more in line with traditional approximation guarantees in computer science.
Additionally, several works that treat  as an additive component also normalize all utilities into
the range [0,1], giving  more of a relative role rather than a strict additive one.
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or use an alternate protocol. In FlightPath, we assume that protocols that bound
the gain from cheating to  ≤ 110 are suﬃcient to discourage rational deviations.
FlightPath is the ﬁrst p2p system that is based on an approximate equilib-
rium. To our knowledge, FlightPath is the ﬁrst work to explore how these equilibria
can be used to trade oﬀ resilience to rational manipulation against practical con-
cerns such as performance and overhead. Other works [15, 20], which have been
mainly theoretical, have used approximate equilibria only when the strict versions
have been diﬃcult to ﬁnd.
A peer’s utility As in BAR Gossip, rational peers are interested in acquiring
updates to reconstruct a data stream. A rational peer beneﬁts from delivering a
jitter-free stream and beneﬁts less as jitter gets worse. Rational peers incur cost
by uploading bytes. In contrast to BAR Gossip, we assume downloading costs are
negligble. We again assume that eviction is a suﬃcient penalty to deter any peer
from sending a message that the receiver could present as a PoM.
Although FlightPath is not tied to any speciﬁc utility function that combines
these beneﬁts and costs, we provide one here for concreteness. Note that crafting a
utility function that accurately captures a peer’s utility is a dark art at best. We
therefore design a conservative function deﬁning a peer i′s utility when strategy
proﬁle s is played as
ui(s) = (1− ji)β − wiκ
where ji is the average number of jitter events per minute that i experiences, wi
is the average upload bandwidth used by i in kilobits per second, β is the beneﬁt
received from a jitter free data stream, and κ is the cost for each kilobit per second
of upload bandwidth consumed. We consider this function conservative because a
peer’s beneﬁt decreases rapidly according to the number of jitter events experienced:
a peer that is jittered once every minute obtains no beneﬁt, while a peer that is
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jittered once every ten minutes receives 90% of the beneﬁt. At the end of this
chapter, we show how the beneﬁt to cost ratio ( (1−ji)βwiκ ) aﬀects the  we can bound
in an -Nash equilibrium.
6.2 Design
We discuss FlightPath’s design in three iterations. In the ﬁrst, we give an overview of
a basic structure, similar to Balanced Exchange, that allows peers to trade updates
with one another. We design trades to force rational peers to act faithfully in each
trade until the last possible action, where deviating can save only negligible cost.
This basic protocol allows few opportunities for a peer to game the system, but
by the same token, it provides few options for dynamically adapting to phenomena
like bad links, malicious peers, or overload. Therefore, in the second iteration, we
describe how we add controlled amounts of choice to the basic trading protocol to
improve its performance dramatically. In the third iteration, we show how to modify
the protocol to deal with changing membership.
In contrast to our previous discussion of Balanced Exchange, readers may be
surprised to see that in the last two iterations we do not argue step-by-step about
possible ways to cheat and why a rational peer would not. This diﬀerence is due to
the ﬂexibility of approximate equilibria, which allows optimizations that improve a
user’s start-to-ﬁnish beneﬁts and costs, while still limiting any possible gains from
cheating. At the end of this chapter, we show that a rational peer expects little to
gain from attempting to cheat.
6.2.1 Basic Protocol
Prior to a live event, peers contact the tracker to join a streaming session. After
authenticating each peer, the tracker assigns unique random member ids to peers
and posts a static membership list for the session.
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In each round, the source sends two kinds of updates: stream updates and
linear digests. A stream update contains the actual contents of the stream. The
source tags each stream update with the round in which it is multicast and the order
in which it should be delivered in a round. Each stream update can be uniquely
identiﬁed by its round number and order in which it should be delivered, a pair
of numbers we refer to as an update id. A linear digest [32] contains information
that allows peers to authenticate received stream updates. The source associates
one or more linear digests to each round and includes update ids and corresponding
secure hashes of stream updates in those digests. The source signs linear digests
so that their contents can be immediately authenticated. We use linear digests in
place of digitally signing every stream update to reduce the computational load and
bandwidth necessary to run FlightPath. The source sends each of the ups per round
unique stream updates for a round to a small fraction seed frac of random peers
in the system. When the source multicasts stream updates to selected peers at the
beginning of every round, it also sends them the appropriate linear digests.
In each round, peers initiate and accept trades from their neighbors. We
provide Figure 6.1 for reference and base our design on Balanced Exchange. A
trade consists of four phases:
Partner Selection: A peers selects a partner using a veriﬁable pseudo-random
algorithm.
History Exchange: Partners exchange histories describing which updates they
possess and which they still need. Partners use the histories to compute de-
terministically the exact updates they expect to receive and are obligated to
send, under the constraint that partners exchange equal numbers of updates.
Update Exchange: Partners swap updates by encrypting them and sending the
encrypted data in a briefcase message. Immediately afterwards, a peer sends
66
Basic Trading Protocol
Sender (S) Receiver (R)
seed = <round>S
check: seed is valid
PRNG(seed) maps to R
k = min( | HS-HR |, | HR-HS | )
check: update ids are expected
decrypt updates {u1, ..., uk}
<BRIEFCASE, S, R, seed, {(u1.id, u1#(u1)
), ..., (uk.id, uk#(uk)
)}>
<PROMISE, S, R, seed, {(u1.id, #u1#(u1)
), ..., (uk.id, #uk#(uk)
) }>
<KEY_RESPONSE, S, R, seed,
 
{(u1.id, #u1), ..., (uk.id, #uk)}>
<DIVULGE, S, R, seed, HS>S
<HISTORY_RESPONSE, R, S, seed, HR>
<HISTORY_REQUEST, S, R, seed, #(HS)>
<BRIEFCASE, R, S, seed, {(u'1.id, u'1#(u'1)
), ..., (u'k.id, u'k#(u'k)
)}>
<PROMISE, R, S, seed, {(u'1.id, #u'1#(u'1)
), ..., (u'k.id, #u'k#(u'k)
) }>
promise matches briefcase
check: update ids are expected
promise matches briefcase
<KEY_RESPONSE, S, R, seed,
 
{(u'1.id, #u'1), ..., (u'k.id, #u'k)}>
decrypt updates {u'1, ..., u'k}
Figure 6.1: Illustration of a trade in the basic protocol.
a promise pledging that the contents of its briefcase are legitimate and not
garbage data.
Key Exchange: Once a peer receives a briefcase and matching promise message
from its trading partner, that peers sends the decryption keys necessary to
unlock the briefcase it sent.
In contrast to BAR Gossip and BAR-B [3], FlightPath peers do not sign every
protocol message. Promises are the only digitally signed message in a trade; peers
authenticate other messages using message authentication codes [73]. As in balanced
exchange, these phases guarantee that a rational peer has to upload the bulk of data
in a trade to obtain any beneﬁt from the trade. By deferring gratiﬁcation and holding
67
peers accountable via promise messages, we limit how much a cheating strategy can
gain over obeying the protocol. The main diﬀerence between trades in this protocol
compared to balanced exchanges in BAR Gossip is the addition of the promise.
We structure promises so that for each briefcase there is exactly one matching
promise. Further, if a briefcase contains garbage data, then the matching promise is
a PoM. Briefcases and promises provide this property because of how we intertwine
these two kinds of messages. For each update u that a peer is obligated to send, that
peer includes the pair 〈u.id, u〈#u〉〉 in the briefcase it sends, where u〈#u〉 denotes
update u encrypted with a hash of itself. For each entry in the briefcase, the
matching promise message contains a pair 〈u.id,#(u〈#u〉)〉. Therefore, if a briefcase
holds garbage data, then the matching promise message would serve as a PoM since
that promise would contain at least one pair in which the hash for a self-encrypted
update is wrong. Of course, a peer could upload garbage data in its briefcase but
send a legitimate promise message to avoid sending a POM, but then the briefcase
and promise would not match and that peer’s partner would refuse to send the
decryption keys.
6.2.2 Taming Gossip
Gossip protocols are well-known for their robustness [10, 21, 23, 29, 30, 74, 76] and
are especially attractive in a BAR environment because their robustness helps tol-
erate Byzantine peers. However, while gossip’s pair-wise interactions make crafting
incentives easier than in a tree-based streaming system, it is reasonable to question
whether that very randomness may make gossip inappropriate for streaming live
data in which updates need to be propagated to all nodes by a hard deadline.
In this section, we explain how the ﬂexibility of approximate equilibria allows
us to tame gossip’s randomness by dynamically adapting run-time decisions. For
concreteness, we show in Figures 6.2 and 6.3 how poorly the basic protocol performs
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Figure 6.2: Reverse cumulative distribution of jitter.
when disseminating a 200 Kbps stream to 517 clients. In this experiment, the source
generates ups per round = 50 unique stream updates per round and sends each one
to a random seed frac = 5% of the peers. Updates expire deadline = 10 rounds
from the round in which they are sent. Figure 6.2 shows a reverse cumulative
distribution of jitter experienced by peers. To read this graph, it may be useful
to focus where the arrow is pointing. At that point, approximately 80% of peers
are jittered at least 2% of the time. Figure 6.3 depicts cumulative distributions
of peers’ average and peak upload bandwidths. We observe that a peer uses 300
kbps on average, a modest overhead that many home broadband connections can
handle. Peak bandwidths, however, far exceed the constraints that most cable or
DSL connections can bear.
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Figure 6.3: Cumulative distribution of average and peak bandwidths.
In the rest of this subsection, we explore how to modify the basic trading
protocol both to reduce jitter and to lower consumed bandwidth. The ﬁrst set
of modiﬁcations aim at capping the peak bandwidth used by the protocol. As
expected, by reining in gossip’s largesse with bandwidth, these improvements make
jitter worse. With these techniques in place though, we are free to explore ways to
reduce jitter while constraining bandwidth to reasonable limits.
Reservations: One of the problems of using gossip to stream live data is the
widely variable number of trading partners a peer may have in any given round. In
particular, although the expected number of trades in which a peer participates in
each round is two, the actual number varies widely, occasionally going past eight.
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concurrent trades.
Such high numbers of concurrent trades are undesirable for two reasons. First, a
peer can be overwhelmed and be unable to ﬁnish all of its concurrent trades within
a round. Figure 6.3 illustrates this problem as a high peak bandwidth in the basic
protocol, making it impractical in bandwidth-constrained environments. Second, a
peer is likely to waste bandwidth by trading for duplicate updates when participating
in many concurrent trades.
Rather than accept all incoming connections, FlightPath distributes the num-
ber of concurrent trades more evenly by providing a limited amount of ﬂexibility
in partner selection. The idea is simple. A peer S reserves a trade with a part-
ner R before the round rnd in which that trade should happen. If R has already
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accepted a reservation for S, then S looks for a diﬀerent partner. Figure 6.4 illus-
trates that this straight-forward approach can signiﬁcantly reduce the probability
of a peer committing to more than two concurrent trades in a round. At the same
time, reservations also reduce the probability that a peer is only involved in the one
trade it initiates each round. The challenge in implementing reservations is how to
give peers veriﬁable ﬂexibility in their trading partners.
FlightPath provides each peer a small set of potential partners in each round.
We craft this set carefully to address several requirements:
1. Peers need to select partners in a suﬃciently random way to retain gossip’s
robustness.
2. Each peer needs enough choices to avoid overloaded or Byzantine peers.
3. A peer’s partners should be relatively unchanged if the population does not
change much.2
4. The selection algorithm ought to be resilient to attacks in which malicious
peers attempt to position themselves so as to eclipse good peers [69].
Figure 6.5 illustrates how we provide ﬂexibility in choosing a partner while
meeting the above constraints. We force each peer to communicate with at least
log n distinct neighbors by partitioning the membership list of n peers into log n
bins and requiring a peer to choose a partner from a veriﬁable pseudorandomly
chosen bin each round. Leitao et al. demonstrate that a set of gossip partners that
grows logarithmically with system size can tolerate severe disruptions [40]. In round
rnd, peer S seeds a pseudo-random generator with 〈rnd〉S , and uses the generator
to select a bin; note that any peer can verify any other peer’s bin selection.
2Although we discuss dynamic membership in the next section, its demands constrain the partner
selection algorithm we describe here.
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Figure 6.5: Illustration of partner selection algorithm using bins.
Within a bin, we further restrict the nodes with whom a peer can communi-
cate by giving each peer a customized view of each bin’s membership based upon a
peer’s id. We deﬁne S’s view to be all peers R such that the hash of S’s member id
with R’s member id is less than a parameter p. The tracker adjusts p so that almost
every peer is expected to have at least one non-Byzantine partner in every bin. To
achieve this condition, the tracker ﬁrst shuﬄes the membership list so that every
entry has equal likelihood to correspond to a Byzantine peer. The tracker then sets
p to satisfy the following inequality:
[1− [1− p(1− Fbyz)]
n
log n ]log n ≥ 1− 1
n
(6.1)
Though perhaps initially initimidating, the above inequality can be intu-
itively understood. The expression on the left represents the probability that a peer
has at least one non-Byzantine partner in every bin. We wish that probability to
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be suﬃciently high so that nearly all peers save one—represented by the expression
on the right—has at least one non-Byzantine partner in every bin.
Consider two random peers S and R. The probability that R is not Byzantine
and in S’s view is p(1 − Fbyz). Therefore, the probability that for a given bin,
S has no partners or all the partners it does have are Byzantine is [1 − p(1 −
Fbyz)]
n
log n , capturing the probability that a given bin is bad for S. The probability
that a given bin is okay for S is therefore 1 − [1 − p(1 − Fbyz)]
n
log n . Putting it
together, the probability that all of S’s bins are okay is given as the left expression
in Inequality 6.1. Figure 6.6 gives an intuition for how this inequality aﬀects a peer’s
choices as the system scales up and as the bound of Byzantine peers changes. This
two level selection gives us a way to provide log n distinct random partners with high
probability while limiting the variance a single level selection scheme may possess.
A peer S can use the choice provided by the combination of bins and views to
reserve trades. A peer R that receives such a reservation veriﬁes that S’s view con-
tains R and that 〈rnd〉S maps to the bin that contains R’s entry in the membership
list. If these checks pass, then R can either accept or reject the reservation.
As a general rule, peer R accepts a reservation only if it has not already ac-
cepted another reservation for the same round. Otherwise, S rejects the reservation,
and S attempts a reservation with a diﬀerent peer. Peer S can be exempt from this
rule by setting a plead ﬂag in its reservation, indicating that S has few options left.
In this case, R accepts the reservation unless it has already committed to c trades
in round r. We ﬁnd that setting c to 4 is good in practice, as c should be small but
greater than 2 and setting it to 3 did not perform as well as 4.
Splitting need: Reservations are eﬀective in ensuring that peers are never in-
volved in more than 4 concurrent trades. However, a peer that is involved in con-
current trades may still be overwhelmed with more data than it can handle during
a round and may still receive too much duplicate data.
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Figure 6.6: Distribution of view sizes in each bin for diﬀerent membership list sizes.
Graphs are calculated with Fbyz = 5% (top) and 20% (bottom).
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For example, consider a peer S involved in concurrent trades with peers
R0, R1, R2, and R3. Peer S is missing eight updates for a given round. The basic
protocol may overwhelm S and waste bandwidth by having peers R0–R3 each send
those 8 updates to S. Something more intelligent is for c’s need to be split evenly
across its trading partners, limiting each partner to send at most two updates. Note
that while this scheme may be less wasteful than before, c now risks not receiving
the eight updates it needs since it is unlikely that its partners each independently
select disjoint sets of two updates to exchange.
There seems to be a ﬁne line between being conservative to avoid jitter but
receiving redundant data or taking a risk to save resources. We sidestep this trade-oﬀ
by using erasure coding [4, 50].
Erasure codes: Erasure coding has been used in prior works to improve content
distribution [2, 16, 26, 39], but never to support live streaming in a setting with
Byzantine participants. The source codes all of the stream data in a given round
into m > ups per round stream updates such that any ups per round blocks are
necessary and suﬃcient to reconstruct the original data. A peer stops requesting
blocks for a given round once it has a suﬃcient number. Erasure coding has three
important beneﬁts. First, it increases the diversity of updates among peers, making
the barter system we have constructed more eﬀective. Second, it improves the fault-
tolerance of the overall system as it is more resilient to the loss of a few updates.
Third, erasure coding reduces the probability that concurrent trades involve the
same block.
To provide an example of this third beneﬁt, consider a peer S involved in
concurrent trades with R0 and R1. Suppose there are 50 updates per round erasure
coded into 100 blocks. S possesses 44 of those blocks, R0 has 40, and R1 holds
49. Although S only needs 6 blocks to reconstruct the original updates, R0 and R1
probably have more than 6 blocks not in common with S. Combinig the splitting
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Figure 6.7: Reverse cumulative distribution of jitter in the basic trading protocol and
with the reservations, splitting need, and erasure coding techniques incorporated.
need and erasure coding techniques, R0 randomly selects 3 blocks which S does
not possess and trades them to S. R1 takes a similar action. So that peers can
determine exactly which blocks will be traded, peers select blocks pseudo-randomly
based upon the seed value used to initiate the trade.
In our experiments, we erasure code ups per round stream updates into
m = c×ups per round blocks and modify the source to send each one to seed fracc
of the peers. Although coding stream data into more and more blocks can reduce
jitter, we choose not to increase the coding beyond m = 2ups per round because
a greater diversity of blocks also has a side-eﬀect. More coded blocks means that
trades are more eﬀective and peers can gather the updates they need in a shorter
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Figure 6.8: Cumulative distribution of average and peak upload bandwidths in the
basic trading protocol and with the reservations splitting need, and erasure coding
techniques incorporated.
amount of time. However, such eﬃciency hurts peers who may have fallen behind
as they then have fewer opportunities to catch up with their neighbors before those
neighbors acquire all the updates they need.
In Figures 6.7 and 6.8, the source generates 2ups per round = 100 blocks
and sends each one to a random 2.5% of the peers. The reservations, splitting need,
and erasure coding techniques reduce the protocol’s peak bandwidth signiﬁcantly,
but at the cost of making jitter worse. We now describe three techniques that
together nearly eliminate jitter without compromising the steps we have taken to
keep the protocol from overwhelming any peer.
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Figure 6.9: Average jitter as a function of the number k of older rounds from which
a peer prefers to receive updates.
Tail inversion: As in many gossip protocols, the basic trading protocol biases
recent updates over older ones to disseminate new data quickly. However, in a
streaming setting, peers may sometimes value older updates over younger ones, for
example when a set of older updates is about to expire and a peer seeks to avoid
jitter. Indeed, we ﬁnd that after using the techniques described so far, a peer
is typically missing fewer than ﬁve updates for the round in which it experiences
jitter.
The drawback in preferring to trade for updates of an old round is that the
received updates may not be useful in future exchanges because many peers may
already possess enough updates to reconstruct the data streamed in that round.
Indeed, an oldest-ﬁrst bias does not perform well in our experiments. Therefore,
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FlightPath provides a peer with the ﬂexibility to balance recent updates that it
can leverage in future exchanges against older updates that it may be missing.
Instead of requesting updates in most-recent-ﬁrst order, a peer has the option to
receive updates from the k oldest rounds ﬁrst and then updates in most-recent-ﬁrst
order. Figure 6.9 depicts the jitter experienced by peers for values of k ranging from
zero to the deadline (10). When k is zero, peers value updates in a most-recent-
ﬁrst order. When k is equal to the deadline, peers prefer receiving older update.
Our experiments indicate that inverting the tail with k = 2 is very eﬀective at
reducing jitter. However, we acknowledge that this technique is not the result of
deep insight—it simply works well and is the product of a low-level understanding
of the FlightPath system. Better ways to prioritize updates may well exist.
Imbalance ratio: The basic protocol balances trades so that a peer receives no
more than it contributes in any round. Such equity can make it diﬃcult for a peer
that has fallen behind to recover.
FlightPath uses an imbalance ratio imb ratio to introduce ﬂexibility into
how much can be traded. Each peer tracks the number of updates sent to and
received from its neighbors, ensuring that its credits and debits for each partner are
within imb ratio of each other. We ﬁnd that the imbalance ratio’s most dramatic
eﬀect is that it allows individual trades to be very imbalanced if peers have long-
standing relationships.
When imb ratio is set to 1, the trading protocol behaves like a traditional
unbalanced gossip protocol, vulnerable to free-riding behavior [43]. When imb ratio
is set to 0, every trade is balanced, oﬀering little for rational peers to exploit, but also
allowing unlucky peers to suﬀer signiﬁcant jitter. We would like to set imb ratio
to be as low as possible while maintaining low jitter. In Figure 6.10, we show the
impact diﬀerent imbalance ratios have on peers’ jitter and ﬁnd setting imb ratio
to 10% is an acceptable tradeoﬀ between the competing concerns of reducing jitter
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Figure 6.10: Average jitter as a function of the imbalance ratio. For readability, the
scale of the y-axis is from 0 to 10%.
while limiting the incentives for rational peers to cheat. Figure 6.11 shows how the
tail inversion and imbalance ratio techniques reduce jitter, while illustrating that
both techniques have a small impact on the bandwidth consumed.
Trouble Detector: Our ﬁnal improvement takes advantage of the partner ﬂexibil-
ity aﬀorded by the reservation mechanism. Each peer monitors its own performance
by tracking how many updates it still needs for each round. If its performance falls
below a threshold, then that peer proactively initiates more than one trade in a
round to avoid jitter. Peers treat this option as a safety net, as increasing the av-
erage number of concurrent trades also increases the average cost to trade for each
unique update.
We implement a simple detection module that informs a peer whether re-
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Figure 6.11: Reverse cumulative distribution showing impact of tail inversion and
imbalance ratio techniques on reducing jitter. CDFs of average and peak band-
widths demonstrating tail inversion and imbalance ratio techniques impose modest
overhead.
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Figure 6.12: Reverse CDFs showing how peers can use the trouble detector to reduce
jitter by proactively initiating more trades.
serving more trades may be advisable. We assume that after each round a peer
expects to double the number of updates that have not yet expired up to the point
of possessing ups per round updates for each round. In practice, we ﬁnd that peers
typically gather updates more quickly than just doubling them. If a peer c notices
that it possesses fewer updates than the detection module advises, c schedules ad-
ditional trades. Note that this is a local choice, based only on how many packets
the peer has received for that round. Figure 6.13 demonstrates the eﬀectiveness of
adding the trouble detector module.
6.2.3 Dynamic Membership
We now explain how to augment the protocol to handle peers joining and leaving
the system. In FlightPath, the main challenge is in allowing peers to join an existing
streaming session. Gossip’s robustness to benign failures lends FlightPath a natural
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Figure 6.13: CDFs of average and peak bandwidths demonstrating modest overheads
due to the trouble detection technique.
resilience to departures. However, the tracker still monitors peers to discover if
any have left the system abruptly. Currently, we employ a simple pinging protocol,
although we could use more sophisticated mechanisms as in Fireﬂies [35].
When a peer attempts to join a session, it expects to begin reliably receiving
a stream without a long delay. As system designers, we have to balance that expec-
tation against the resources available to get that peer up to speed. In particular,
dealing with a ﬂash crowd where the ratio of new peers to old ones is high presents
a challenge. Moreover, in a BAR environment, we have to be careful in providing
beneﬁt to any peer who has not earned it. For example, if a single peer joins a
system consisting of 50 peers, it may be desirable for all 50 to aid the new partic-
ipant using balanced trades so that the new peer cannot free-ride oﬀ the system.
However, consider the case when instead of a single peer joining, 200 or 400 join. It
is unreasonable to expect the original 50 to support a population of 400 peers who
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initially have nothing of value to contribute.
Below, we describe two mechanisms for allowing peers to join the system.
The ﬁrst allows the tracker to modify the membership list and to disseminate that
list to all relevant peers. The second lets a new peer immediately begin trading
so that it does not have to wait in silence until all peers have been notiﬁed of its
presence.
Epochs: A FlightPath tracker periodically updates the membership list to reﬂect
joins and leaves. The tracker deﬁnes a new membership list at the beginning of
each epoch, where the ﬁrst epoch contains the ﬁrst epoch len rounds, the second
epoch contains the next epoch len rounds and so on. If a peer joins in epoch e, the
tracker places that peer into the membership list that will be used in epoch e + 2.
At the boundary between epochs e and e + 1, the tracker shuﬄes the mem-
bership list for epoch e + 2 and notiﬁes the source of the shuﬄed list. Shuﬄing
prevents Byzantine peers from attempting to position themselves at speciﬁc indices
of the membership list, so as to take over a bin. Recall that we construct each peer’s
membership view to be independent of these indices so as not to end long-standing
relationships prematurely.
After the tracker notiﬁes the source of the next epoch’s membership list, the
source divides that list into pieces and places each piece into a third kind of update:
a partial membership list. The source signs these lists and distributes them to peers
as it would a stream update. Peers can trade partial membership lists just like
they trade linear digests and stream updates. The only diﬀerence is that partial
membership lists are given priority over all other updates in a trade and only expire
when the epoch corresponding to that list ends. Once a peer obtains every partial
membership list for an epoch, that peer can reconstruct the original membership
list and use it to select trading partners.
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Figure 6.14: Illustration of the tub protocol from peer S’s perspective. Shaded
entries represent peers that S can contact for a trade when appropriate. Note that
S only uses bins for its own tub and the immediately preceding one.
Tub Algorithm: As described, a new peer would have to wait at least one epoch
before it appears in the membership list and can begin to trade. FlightPath aug-
ments the static partner selection algorithm that uses bins with an online algorithm
that allows new peers to begin trading immediately without overwhelming the ex-
isting peers in the system. This algorithm also allows every peer to verify partner
selections without global knowledge of how many peers joined nor of when they
did so. Intuitively, our algorithm organizes all peers into tubs such that the ﬁrst
tub contains the peers in the current epoch’s membership list and subsequent tubs
contain peers who have recently joined. A peer selects partners from its own tub
and also from any tub preceding its own. However, the probability that a peer from
tub t selects from a tub t′ < t decreases geometrically with t− t′. This arrangement
ensures that the load on a peer from all subsequent tubs is bound by a constant
regardless of how many peers join. Figure 6.14 illustrates our algorithm.
For clarity, we describe our online algorithm assuming all peers have a global
list that enumerates every peer in the system. Later, we show that this knowledge
is unnecessary. The ﬁrst n indices in this global list correspond to the n indices of
the current epoch’s membership list. The rest of the global list is sorted according
to the order in which peers joined. We divide the global list into tubs where the ﬁrst
tub corresponds to the ﬁrst n indices of the global list, the second tub to the next
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n indices, and so forth.
A peer S’s membership view depends on its position in the global list. If S
is in the ﬁrst tub, its view and how it selects partners is unchanged from the static
case (Section 6.2.2). If S is in a tub t > 1, S’s view obeys three constraints:
1. Only peers that precede S in the list can be in S′s view..
2. If R is in tub t or t− 1, then R is in S′s view iﬀ the hash of concatenating S’s
member id with R’s member id is less than p (see inequality 6.1).
3. If R is in a tub t′ < t− 1, then R is in S’s view iﬀ the hash of S’s member id
concantenated with R’s member id is less than a parameter p′.
We use a parameter p′ diﬀerent from our previous bins-based parameter p to
address two competing concerns. We want new peers to not overwhelm older ones
and so peers select from a tub with decreasing probability the farther away that
tub is. However, because new peers select less frequently from tubs that are not
adjacent, it may be harder for a new peer to build a relationship with older ones and
take advantage of the imbalance ratio. We can resolve the tension between wanting
less frequent contact between some peers yet still allowing them to quickly build a
relationship by giving a new peer the same small set of possible partners every time
it chooses a tub. The tracker adjusts p′ according to inequality (6.2) so that almost
every peer is expected to have at least one non-Byzantine partner in every tub.
[1− p′(1− Fbyz)]n ≤ 1
n
(6.2)
A new peer S in tub tS > 1 selects a trading partner for round r using two
veriﬁable pseudo-random numbers, rand1 and rand2. First, S uses rand1 to select
a tub, exponentially weighting the selection towards its own tub. If S selects a tub
t < tS − 1, then S can trade with any peer in tub t that is also in S’s view. If
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S selects either its own tub or the one immediately preceding its tub, then S uses
rand2 to make the bin selection. S maps rand2 to a bin starting from the ﬁrst bin
in tub t− 1 and ending with S’s own bin. From the selected bin, S can trade with
any peer in its view.
If every peer knew the global list, then it would be straight-forward to select
and verify trading partners. Fortunately, this global knowledge is unnecessary: to
select trading partners, a newly joined peer only needs to know the peers in its own
view, the epoch in which those peers joined the system, and the indices of those
peers in the global list. When a peer S joins the system, S obtains such information
directly from the tracker.
To verify that a peer S selects a partner R appropriately, R needs to know
S’s index in the global membership list. The tracker encodes such information in a
join token that it gives to S when S joins the system. The join token speciﬁes S’s
index in the global list for the two epochs until S is part of an epoch’s membership
list. S includes its join token in its reservation message to R.
6.3 Evaluation
We now show that FlightPath is a robust p2p live streaming protocol. Through
experiments on over 500 peers, we demonstrate that FlightPath:
• Reduces jitter by several orders of magnitude compared to BAR Gossip
• Caps peak bandwidth usage to within the constraints of a cable or ADSL
connection
• Maintains low jitter and eﬃciently uses bandwidth despite ﬂash crowds
• Recovers quickly from sudden peer departures
• Continues to deliver a steady stream despite churn
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• Tolerates up to 10% of peers acting maliciously
6.3.1 Methodology
We use FlightPath to disseminate a 200 Kbps data stream to several hundred peers
distributed across Utah’s Emulab and UT Austin’s public Linux machines. In most
experiments, we use 517 peers, but drop to 443 peers in the churn and Byzantine
experiments as the availability of Emulab machines declined. We run each experi-
ment 3 times. When we present cumulative distributions, we combine points from
all three experiments. We include standard deviation when doing so keeps ﬁgures
readable.
In our experiments, rounds last 2 seconds and epochs last 40 rounds. In
each round, the source sends 100 Reed-Solomon coded stream updates and 2 linear
digests. 50 stream updates are necessary and suﬃcient to reconstruct the original
data. Stream updates expire 10 rounds after they are sent. The source sends each
stream update to a random 2.5% of peers. Stream updates are 1072 bytes, linear
digests are 1153 bytes, and partial membership lists are 1650 bytes.
We implement FlightPath in Python using MD5 for secure hashes and RSA-
full domain hashing with 512 bit keys for digital signatures. Peers exchange public
certiﬁcates and agree on secret keys for MACs a few seconds before communicating
with one another for the ﬁrst time. Peers also set the budget for how many updates
they are willing to upload in a round to μ = 100, which is split evenly across
concurrent trades.
6.3.2 Experiments
Steady State Operation: In the ﬁrst experiment, we run FlightPath on 517
peers to assess its performance under a relatively well-behaved and static environ-
ment. Figure 6.15 shows that the average jitter of FlightPath is orders of magnitude
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Figure 6.15: Average jitter in FlightPath and BAR Gossip peers. (n = 517)
lower than BAR Gossip. Of the three experiments we ran for one hour, the worst
jitter was in an experiment in which 1 peer missed 6 seconds of video, 5 peers missed
4 seconds, and 3 peers missed 2 seconds. All jitter events occurred during the ﬁrst
minute. This eﬀect can be explained by the scarcity of items to be traded initially.
As the stream continues, peers possess more updates to barter amongst one an-
other. Figure 6.16 conﬁrms that peers use approximately 250 Kbps on average and
also depicts cumulative distributions tracing the peak bandwidth of each peer along
with curves for the 99 and 95 percentile bandwidth curves. As in Section 6.2.2, the
combination of reservations, splitting a peer’s need and erasure coding is eﬀective
in capping peak bandwidth.
Joins: We now examine how well FlightPath handles joins into the system. In
particular, we evaluate how well the tub algorithm (described in Section 6.2.3),
handles large populations of peers who seek to join a streaming session all at once.
90
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
 0  100  200  300  400  500  600
%
 o
f p
ee
rs
Bandwidth (Kbps)
average
95 percentile
99 percentile
peak
Figure 6.16: Distributions of peers’ average, 95 percentile, 99 percentile, and peak
bandwidths. (n = 517)
In this experiment, we start a session with 50 peers. When the second epoch begins
at round 41, varying numbers of peers simultaneously attempt to join the system. As
Figure 6.17 illustrates, the average bandwidth of the original peers rises noticeably
immediately after the ﬁrst epoch and settles to a higher level than before. When
the fourth epoch begins and new peers are integrated into the membership list,
average bandwidth of the original 50 drops back to its previous levels. As shown,
FlightPath peers are relatively unaﬀected by joining events. None of the original 50
peers experienced a jitter event during any of these experiments. Also note that the
peak bandwidth across all three runs of each experiment was 482.5 Kbps.
Figure 6.17 shows that the tub algorithm is eﬀective in ensuring that newer
peers do not overwhelm older ones. Note that this resilience is easy to achieve at
the expense of the newer peers. For example, one could imagine FlightPath without
the tub algorithm, requiring new peers to wait over an epoch before participating in
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Figure 6.17: Bandwidth of peers already in the system with diﬀerent sized ﬂash
crowds. (n = 50)
the system. Such an approach would be very resilient to ﬂash crowds since it would
require those crowds to sit idly until the system could accommodate them.
The tub algorithm’s contribution is its resilience to ﬂash crowds while letting
new peers deliver the stream quickly and reliably. Figure 6.18 depicts the number
of rounds a peer may have to wait before it begins to deliver a stream reliably. We
deﬁne the round in which a peer reliably begins to deliver a stream as the ﬁrst round
in which a peer experiences no jitter for three rounds. Interestingly, we see that if
more peers join, the average delay decreases. This eﬀect can be explained by our
tub algorithm. The peers in the last tub are contacted the least. In the experiment
in which only 50 peers join, all of the newly joined peers are in the last tub. The
last tub in the experiment with 400 peers joining has a similar problem, but the last
tub is masked by the success of the preceding 7 tubs.
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Figure 6.18: CDF of join delays for diﬀerent size joining crowds. (n = 50)
Departures: Figure 6.19 shows FlightPath’s resilience to large fractions of a pop-
ulation suddenly departing. Departing peers exit abruptly without notifying the
tracker or completing reserved trades. The ﬁgure shows the percentage of peers
jittered after a massive departure event of 70% and 75% of random peers. We chose
these fractions because smaller fractions had little observable eﬀect with respect to
jitter. The ﬁgure shows that there exists a threshold between 70% and 75% in which
FlightPath cannot tolerate any more departures.
FlightPath’s resilience to such massive departures is a consequence of a few
traits. First, peers discover very quickly whether potential partners have left or not
via the reservation system. Second, peers have choice in their partner selection, so
they can avoid recently departed peers. Finally, each peer’s trouble detector helps in
reacting quickly to avoid jitter. Figure 6.20 shows the eﬀect of the trouble predictor.
Average bandwidth of remaining peers drops dramatically after the leave event, but
then spikes sharply to make up for missed trading opportunities.
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Figure 6.21: Average jitter as churn increases.(n = 443)
Churn: We now evaluate how FlightPath performs under varying amounts of
churn. In our experiments, peers join and then leave after an exponentially ran-
dom amount of time. We intend this behavior to model users who join a stream and
shortly thereafter switch to a diﬀerent stream. Those who have been in the system
longer are more likely to stay. Because short-lived participants are proportionally
more aﬀected by their start-up transients, our presentation segregates peers by the
amount of time they remain in the system.
Figure 6.21 shows average jitter as we increase churn. The average jitter
of peers who join the system for at least 10 seconds steadily increases with churn.
Peers who stay in the system for at least 640 seconds experience very little jitter
even when 37% of peers churn every minute. In these experiments, all jitter events
occur in the ﬁrst two minutes after joining a streaming session. Afterwards, the
chance of being jittered falls to nearly 0.
Figure 6.22 shows that churn does manifest as increasing join delays for new
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Figure 6.22: Join delay under churn.(n = 443)
peers. We see that the time needed to join a session is unacceptable under high
amounts of churn. This quality points to a weakness of FlightPath and suggests
a need for a bootstrapping mechanism for new peers. However, care needs to be
exercised in not allowing peers to game the system by abusing the bootstrapping
mechanism to obtain updates without uploading.
Malicious attack: In this experiment, we evaluate FlightPath’s ability to deliver
a stream reliably in the presence of Byzantine peers. While any peer whose utility
function is unknown is strictly speaking Byzantine in our model, we are especially
interested in understanding how FlightPath behaves under attack, when Byzantine
peers behave maliciously.
Although malicious peers cannot make a non-Byzantine peer deliver an in-
authentic update, they can harm the system by hurting performance. A malicious
peer could hamper the dissemination of updates or increase the overhead for other
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Figure 6.23: Jitter with malicious peers. (n = 443)
peers. For example, malicious peers could simultaneously halt all communication
to disrupt others. However, we have already seen that FlightPath is very robust to
such benign failures. More deviously, malicious peers could launch a coordinated
eﬀort to monopolize as many trading opportunities as allowed without making those
trades useful to partners. We explore this concerted attack next.
In the following experiment, malicious peers act normally for the ﬁrst 100
rounds of the protocol. Starting in round 100, they initiate as many trades as they
can and respond positively to all trade reservations, seeking to monopolize as many
trades in the system as possible. The malicious peers participate in the history
exchange phase of a trade but in no subsequent phase. In a history exchange, a
malicious peer reports that it has all the updates that are less than 3 rounds old
and is missing all the other updates. This strategy commits a large amount of its
partner’s bandwidth to the exchange, while committing little of the malicious peer’s.
Ultimately, non-Byzantine peers ﬁnd trades with Byzantine ones useless.
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Figure 6.24: Bandwidth with malicious peers. (n = 443)
Figure 6.23 shows the percentage of peers jittered when 12%, 14%, and 16% of
peers behave in this malicious way. We elide the experiment in which 10% of peers
are Byzantine because no peer suﬀered jitter in those experiments. Figure 6.24,
which depicts the average bandwidth of non-Byzantine peers, is similar to the one
in which peers abruptly leave the system. The subtle diﬀerence is that the average
bandwidth used remains higher with more Byzantine peers.
Wide Area Network: Finally, we evaluate how FlightPath performs under wide
area network conditions. In this experiment, we use 300 clients on a local area net-
work but delay all packets between clients according to measured Internet latencies.
We assign each client a random identity from the 1700+ hosts listed in the King data
set of Internet latencies [28]. We use the data set to delay every packet according
to its source and destination.
As in the case without added delays, all jitter events occurred in the ﬁrst
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Figure 6.25: Bandwidth under WAN conditions. (n = 300)
minute of the experiments. Figure 6.25 depicts the average percentage of peers jit-
tered in the ﬁrst minute, the average upload bandwidth, and the peak upload band-
width for our experiments with the added delays and without. Aside from a slight
increase (almost 10 Kbps) in average upload bandwidth, peak upload bandwidth
rose by approximately 40 Kbps. These increases are the result of some exchanges
not completing by the end of a round, requiring peers involved to make up for the
loss in subsequent rounds.
6.4 Equilibria Analysis
In contrast to previous rigorous approaches to dissuade rational deviation, Flight-
Path does not ensure that every step of the protocol is in every peer’s best interest.
Indeed, it is easy to imagine circumstances in which a peer might beneﬁt from de-
viating, for example, by setting the plead ﬂag early to increase the likelihood that
99
a selected peer will accept its invitation. Instead, FlightPath ensures an -Nash
equilibrium in which no peer can signiﬁcantly improve its overall utility regardless
of how it makes these individual choices.
The high level argument is simple. A peer can only increase its utility by ob-
taining more beneﬁt (receiving less jitter) or reducing cost (uploading fewer bytes).
Since we engineered FlightPath to provide very low jitter in a wide range of en-
vironments, a peer has very little ability to obtain more beneﬁt. With respect to
decreasing costs, we structure trades so that they are relatively balanced.
We now develop this argument more formally to bound the added utility
that can be gained by a peer who deviates. We analyze FlightPath in the steady
state case and ignore transient start-up eﬀects or end game scenarios, which would
matter little in the overall utility of watching something as long as a movie.
6.4.1 Deﬁning 
We begin by revisiting the utility function ui(s) = (1− ji)β −wiκ. Recall that ji is
the average number of jitter events per minute that i experiences, β is the beneﬁt
from watching a jitter-free stream, wi is i′s average upload bandwidth in kilobits
per second, and κ is the cost per Kbps. Let s be the strategy proﬁle corresponding
to when all peers obey the FlightPath protocol and let us consider a peer i. We
desire that no matter how clever i may be, i expects to beneﬁt little from following
any strategy s∗i = si. More formally,
∀s∗i ∈ Si : ui(s−i, s∗i ) ≤ (1 + )ui(s)
We can therefore bound  as follows:
 ≥ u
∗
i (s−i, s∗i )− ui(s)
ui(s)
=
((1− j∗i )β − w∗i κ)− ((1− ji)β − wiκ)
(1− ji)β − wiκ (6.3)
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We simplify equation 6.3 by assuming that a cheating peer experiences no
jitter, i.e., j∗i = 0.
 ≤ jiβ − (w
∗
i − wi)κ
(1− ji)β − wiκ (6.4)
We then divide the numerator and denominator by the expected cost to
understand how epsilon changes as a function of the beneﬁt to cost ratio c = (1−ji)βwiκ ,
which we assume to be greater than 1.
 ≤
cji
1−ji +
wi−w∗i
wi
c− 1 (6.5)
Inequality 6.5 captures  as a function of the beneﬁt-to-cost ratio c, the
expected number of jitter events per minute ji, and the proportional savings in cost
w∗i −wi
wi
. We can gain an intuitive understanding of this bound on  by considering
three cases. First, if obeying the FlightPath protocol provides no jitter and no
cost can be saved by cheating, then FlightPath would be a Nash equilibrium for
all beneﬁt-to-cost ratios greater than 1. Second, if cost matters little compared to
beneﬁt, c  1, then  is essentially bound by ji1−ji , indicating that as expected
jitter increases so does the gap in utilities between obeying and cheating. Third, if
obedience provides no jitter, the important term is the proportional savings in cost
achieved by cheating, which matters less and less as c increases.
We present our analysis in two stages. In the ﬁrst, we provide a lower bound
on the bandwidth w∗i required by i when following s∗i . In the second stage, we
develop a conservative estimate for the jitter a peer expects to see and the upload
bandwidth a peer expects to use.
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6.4.2 A lower bound for w∗i
In FlightPath, a peer who cheats still expects to pay costs. We purposefully structure
trades so that a cheating peer has to pay most of the cost in an exchange before
obtaining anything useful from the interaction. We take advantage of this fact when
we derive the minimum amount of upload bandwidth a peer needs to use so to obtain
all the updates it needs.
Recall that each peer needs ups per round stream updates for every round
to avoid jitter events and that the source distributes linear digests so that peers
can authenticate stream updates. To simplify the analysis, we assume that peers
obtain all the linear digests they need directly from the source. However, peers may
have to trade for partial membership lists to continue participating in the system.
In a system of size n, a peer needs  nentries per partial partial membership
lists every epoch len rounds, where entries per partial is the number of peer
entries in each partial membership list; in our prototype, we include at most 30
entries in each partial membership list. In a given epoch, a peer expects to have to
gather missing per epoch updates via trades, where missing per epoch = (1 −
seed frac)(ups per round× epoch len+  nentries per partial.
Assuming that i is lucky or clever enough to upload no more updates than
it has to in all trades, i still uploads at least min upload = missing per epoch
1+imb ratio 
updates in every epoch. Since i expects no peer to upload more than budget updates
in a single trade, i therefore expects to participate in at least min uploadbudget  trades
in each epoch.
We combine the above expressions with empirical numbers for the minimum
cost of each trade and how that cost grows as the number of updates sent increases.
Taking into account reservation messages, history exchange messages, briefcases,
promises, and keys, each trade costs at least 698 bytes of upload bandwidth with
each update uploaded costing an additional 1136 bytes. Using the parameter values
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Parameter Description Value
ups per round num stream updates per round needed 50
num coded blocks num stream updates per round 100
entries per partial peer entries per partial membership list 30
seed frac fraction of updates received from source 5%
budget max num of updates sent in a round 100
imb ratio imbalance ratio 10%
epoch len epoch length in rounds 40
r len round length in seconds 2
n system size 500
Table 6.1: Summary of the analysis parameters.
listed in Table 6.4.2, a peer who cheats on average participates in at least 18 trades
every epoch and uploads 1741 updates, meaning that w∗i ≥ 199 Kbps.
6.4.3 An estimate for ji and wi
We develop a bound for  by conservatively estimating expected jitter ji and the
expected upload bandwidth wi. It is diﬃcult to establish a tight bound on both
these values analytically because system dynamics, system size, and randomness
quickly make a pure mathematical characterization intractable. We therefore take
a conservative approach.
We assume the expected jitter number of jitter events per minute, ji, is 0.01,
indicating that on average a peer expects a jitter event once every ten minutes. The
observed jitter in our prototype is orders of magnitude less than what we assume
here.
We further assume that peers acquire the updates they need by participating
in trades every round. On average, a peer needs to gather missing per epochepoch len 
updates in each round. Ideally, a peer would obtain these updates in one trade,
avoiding the ﬁxed cost for additional trades and not risking having to receive redun-
dant updates. In this analysis, we assume instead that a peer acquires the updates it
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needs in each round through 4 concurrent trades (the maximum number of allowed
concurrent trades). Furthermore, the updates it needs are for the same round and
evenly divided across these concurrent trades to increase the likelihood that updates
acquired at the same time overlap.
Given the parameters listed in Table 6.4.2, missing per epochepoch len  = 48 and
a peer expects that it needs to receive 60 updates spread evenly across 4 concurrent
trades in order to acquire 48 unique updates for each round. Assuming that trades
are relatively balanced for peers who obey the protocol, a peer expects to upload at
approximately wi = 291 Kbps.
Figure 6.26 uses the derived bounds to show epsilon as a function of the
beneﬁt-to-cost ratio. For  = 110 , solving for c in Inequality 6.5 indicates that
FlightPath is a 110 -Nash equilibrium as long as the user values the stream at least
4.63 times as much as the bits uploaded to participate in the system. We also provide
a curve for  using empirical values for expected jitter and average bandwidth instead
of analytical ones. In practice, it appears as though FlightPath remains a 110 -Nash
equilibrium for c ≥ 3.07.
6.5 Discussion
Recall that our shift from exact equilibria to their approximate counterparts is the
result of a broad frustration with the former approach. In BAR Gossip, our mech-
anisms to meet an exact solution concept incur high overheads while providing no
way to deal with dynamic membership. Moreover, our inability to show Optimistic
Push is a Nash equilibrium even under a constrained strategy space is disappointing.
We address many of the shortcomings of exact approaches by designing sys-
tems to be approximate equilibria. The practical advantages are clear; we can
engineer practical solutions that are ﬂexible enough to handle many adverse situa-
tions, such as churn and Byzantine peers. In addition to those practical beneﬁts,
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Figure 6.26:  as a function of the beneﬁt to cost ratio.
approximate equilibria also have more subtle theoretical ones. The analysis we pro-
vide in the previous section allows for rational peers who may pursue strategies that
consider concurrent and future trades. Note that it remains diﬃcult and perhaps
intractable to determine the best way for a peer to cheat. However, demonstrating
that a system, such as FlightPath, is an approximate equilibrium does not require
ﬁnding the best strategy to cheat, but rather bounding the gains possible from any
cheating to a small factor.
Approximate equilibria free us from having to micro-manage our protocols
so we no longer have to ensure that obeying each step is in every rational peer’s best
interest. That freedom aﬀects how we design systems and how we describe them, a
change that is apparent when comparing the chapters on Balanced Exchange and
FlightPath. In the former, we interpose lemmas and proofs with prose that describes
how a balanced exchange works and why rational peers would obey. In this chapter,
we describe FlightPath’s basic trading protocol and propose several modiﬁcations,
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focusing on systems issues such as performance and bandwidth and leaving a game
theoretic analysis until the last pages of this chapter. Our contributions in Flight-
Path are a good start to designing practical approaches to curb rational deviations
in p2p systems. In the next and ﬁnal chapter, we discuss some problems that remain
in combining mechanism design with system design.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
This dissertation explores how to design p2p systems to tolerate both Byzantine
peers and rational peers. As we design mechanisms to cope with these peers in a
large-scale system, two themes emerge: obedience and choice. In BAR Gossip, we
focus on obedience, creating the ﬁrst p2p live streaming system that tolerates Byzan-
tine and rational peers. However, our dictatorial approach leads to several practical
and theoretical limitations. Those shortcomings reﬂect a broader frustration with
existing works that focus on designing systems to be exact equilibria.
We next temper obedience with controlled amounts of choice, and use ap-
proximate equilibria to drive the design of FlightPath. This approach lets us reduce
jitter by several orders of magnitude, use bandwidth more eﬃciently, handle churn,
and adapt to attacks. By switching to approximate equilibria, we can retain the
rigor of a formal approach while providing enough ﬂexibility to engineer practical
solutions. BAR Gossip and FlightPath represent good starts in building robust p2p
systems. Yet, many problems remain. We present some open questions below and
put forth initial answers that may lead to interesting avenues for future work.
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Why do none of the presented mechanisms allow peers to be altruistic?
Many p2p systems rely on the existence and participation of users who contribute
more than is required. Taking advantage of user altruism can increase the robustness
and performance of a system and is a desirable goal. Yet, we need to be careful how
we hand out such generosity so that it is not (grossly) abused by rational peers
seeking to contribute less.
How can we add allow altruistic actions without compromising the built-
in incentives? A potential way to introduce altruism while avoiding previous
pitfalls is to have altruistic actions beneﬁt every participant evenly. In a multicast
system such as FlightPath, altruistic peers could relay younger updates to small
subsets of random peers, thereby helping the initial spread of data in the system.
Such a mechanism leaves no room for abuse, as peers cannot control when they
receive these updates. However, it also leaves no avenue for peers to ask for help
when they need it most.
How can we allow peers with few resources to be a part of a system?
Dealing with resource-poor nodes requires us to answer a basic question: do we
want to support nodes who cannot support themselves? If the answer is no, then
the resulting system population would be a self-selecting group capable of meeting
their own needs. If, however, the answer is yes, we need to decide where to obtain
extra resources necessary to support resource-poor users. It is desirable that the
additional resources comes from the other peers in the system.
How can we incentivize users who have a surplus of resources to con-
tribute those resources for the good of others? A possible approach is to
impose a progressive tax as Chu et al. [17] propose. They, however, leave how to
enforce such a tax scheme open. It may be possible to separate a p2p service into
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multiple layers as proposed by Gorinsky et al. [27]. In this scheme, peers have an
incentive to participate in as many layers as possible. However, a peer can only gain
access to a layer by participating suﬃciently at all lower layers. We can tax peers
who can gain access to higher layers more heavily than other peers, thereby forcing
those with more to help those with less.
Can the techniques used in BAR Gossip and FlightPath be extended to
more general content distribution networks? BAR Gossip and FlightPath
create ways for users to barter pieces of information with one another. Because
both systems focus exclusively on streaming live data in which peers are interested
in the same data at the same time, bartering is a simple and eﬀective mechanism to
create incentives for peers to disseminate information. However, in settings such as
content distribution networks or video-on-demand applications, peers may not be
interested in the same data at the same time; direct swaps may not be possible and
a currency or credit-based system may be better suited to encourage cooperation.
What are potential problems in using credits to build a robust p2p sys-
tem? Two common critiques of credit-based systems are that they can oﬀer loop-
holes which participants can abuse or are overly complicated. Many systems oﬀer
a small amount of credit to new users to bootstrap them into the system. With-
out appropriate safeguards against Sybil attacks though, these systems can make it
easy to free-ride. Additionally, a constant inﬂux of credit due to churn can lead to
complex, ad hoc techniques to manage inﬂation and deﬂation.
This dissertation set out with a simple goal: build a p2p live streaming system that
tolerates Byzantine peers and rational peers. Disappointed with systems that justify
their mechanisms informally, we adopt a principled approach based on game theory
and traditional fault-tolerance. In contrast to what the state-of-the-art suggests,
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this work demonstrates that we do not have to sacriﬁce rigor to engineer Byzantine
and rational-tolerant systems that perform well and operate eﬃciently. Key to
our success is a careful balance between enforcing obedience and providing choice
enabled by using approximate equilibria.
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